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Laboratory training : a social-experiential-critical analysis.

Richard Kleiner
University of Massachusetts Amherst

LABORATORY TRAINING:
A SOCIAL-EXPERIENTIAL-CRITICAL ANALYSIS

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RICHARD KLEINER

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RICHARD KLEINER

Approved as to style and content by:

(Chairman of Committee)

(Head of Department)

(Member)

(Member)

(Member)

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To my wife Nancy who learned what the "hard life" was all about when she married me, and helped me when I needed it the most.

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To all, I dedicate the fruits of my labor!

Laboratory Training:
A Social-Experiential-Critical Analysis
(September, 1972)

Richard Kleiner B.B.A. City College of New York
M.S. City College of New York

Directed by: Dr. Donald Carew

ABSTRACT

This study was undertaken to explore laboratory training's potential as a force for social change. To further these ends the following were proposed: (1) laboratory training be studied in relationship to its social context; (2) that its capabilities and limitations as a force for social change be explored; (3) that guidelines be offered which could increase its potential as a force for social change.

In order to accomplish these goals, literature in the field of laboratory training was used as data for this study. The literature was surveyed and then selected writings were analyzed in terms of a social-experiential-critical perspective. Social in the sense that if laboratory training was to be seen as a force for social change then it must be understood in terms of its relationship to current social issues and the larger societal context. Experiential in the sense, that since laboratory training makes strong use of experiential learning it could benefit from concepts that relate the meaning and role of experiences to the social processes we undergo and the relevant social context within which we live out our lives. Critical in the sense that repressed alternatives

exist in our society which if liberated, have the potential to change that society. Laboratory training was seen as an example of such a repressed alternative that offered the possibility of becoming a viable force for social change.

This social-experiential-critical perspective constituted the methodology for the study. The skeleton or outline of this methodology consisted of the following five questions extracted from Mills (1959) The Sociological Imagination:

1. What values are really threatened in our present society?
2. By whom or by what are these values threatened?
3. What is the connection between the threat to these values and their manifestation in terms of personal trouble and public issues?
4. Are people generally aware and concerned about the threat to these values, or do they define the personal troubles and public issues they experience in terms of other values?
5. What are the levers for change?

The substantive part of the methodology consisted of the answers to the issues raised by Mills as extracted from the writings of Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964). These contemporary social critics were chosen because their writings were seen as providing key insights into the social issues raised by laboratory training.

This methodology was then applied to an analysis of selected writings of Kurt Lewin (1948), and Abraham Maslow (1965). These two social scientists were seen as key representatives of the historical and philosophical background out of which current laboratory training

practices have emerged. The methodology was then further applied to analyze selected works of Chris Argyris (1970) and Donald Klein (1968). These two current practitioners of laboratory training were chosen because they exemplify attempts at applying laboratory principles in work with large social systems.

The following were some of the major conclusions and recommendations arrived at in this study:

1. If laboratory training is to be seen as a force for social change, then its interrelatedness with the larger social system must be analyzed and studied.
   A. The dynamics of the system linkages that exist between the technology, the collaborating socialization mechanisms, and the individual's action, attitude, and social role must be studied and analyzed as they relate to laboratory training principles and values.
   B. The analysis of sources of conflict existing between laboratory training values and our society must extend beyond an isolated institutional and community perspective. It should incorporate an analysis of the relationship existing between laboratory values and the predominant cultural values.
2. Laboratory training must clearly differentiate between legitimate personal versus social sources of oppression and conflict. From this there follows a need to develop and study guidelines for distinguishing personal troubles from social issues.
3. Laboratory training must develop a consciousness of the sources of social indoctrination and oppression which precondition people and limit their freedom of mind, spirit, and choice.

4. Laboratory training must recognize and study the danger of it being coopted to serve antithetical ends. It must analyze the processes of protest absorption and develop guidelines as to the appropriate and inappropriate use of its methodology in the selection of its clients.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: A PERSONAL STATEMENT

Human Relations Worker: Change Agent Or Complicitor?

As a person trained in the human relations laboratory approach to change, I have found myself constantly groping with the issue of how my human relations skills and values can survive and prosper in a violent power-oriented world (Walton, 1965).

When I have run human relations workshops I find my values affirmed and my skills sharpened. But when I have left the sanctuary, I share with fellow human relations workers and have attempted to make changes in pluralistic situations, I have experienced a sense of futility and questioned the efficacy of my ways. In these latter situations, human relations skills are not legitimized, collaborative-cooperative frameworks are not the norm, and the option of a laboratory experience is not available (Bennis, 1969).

Slowly I began to realize the dimensions of the problem facing human relations workers. I could no longer see laboratory education as simply a matter of people learning a set of skills and attitudes that they could then readily adapt to their home environment. Rather, human relations training is actually training in a cooperative culture which extols the virtues of collectivism and interdependent behavior. This cooperative culture is very much in conflict with the competitive-individualistic ethos predominating in American society (Henry, 1963; Shepard, 1970; Slater, 1970).

The seemingly irrational power-coercive tactics such as threats, bluffs, and selective violence began to make sense as a logical consequence of a competitive world view. In a society such as ours, we are socialized from childhood on to see that beyond our immediate family no one is really interested in our welfare and desires. We become conditioned to and learn the behaviors that allow us to get as much as we can from an uncaring world. "Rational self-interest" is the term economists use to legitimize such behavior (Shepard, 1965).

The outgrowth of a self-interest philosophy is that the market place becomes the human relations arena. The skills that are valued in this arena are the individual's ability to trade and compete with others for the resources available in the external environment. We find ourselves pitted against each other and soon learn that the best way to succeed in such a system is to become a master Machiavellian where other people become means toward one's own ends. We have institutionalized this "exploitative" world view to such an extent that competition and power tactics tend to validate each other. A self-fulfilling prophesy has been achieved that is mistaken for an inherent reality in human nature (Shepard, 1970).

Into this self-perpetuating, exploitative system enters the isolated human relations worker. He laments conditions of violence, distrust, and human exploitation, and offers an alternative vision of a cooperative world where self-actualization can occur through authentic, caring relationships. His relative isolation, his process orientation, and his desire to remain a democratically oriented neutralist makes him an easy prey for the current system. His methodology is often coopted

to achieve the system's ends. Human relations becomes a ploy that is readily used by the competitive-capitalistic system to achieve a false sense of harmony between the means of production (workers-labor) and ends of production (profit) (Etzioni, 1964; Marcuse, 1964; Mills, 1959).

When the human relations worker engages in organizational development he is attempting to make a cooperative system out of a competitive one. How does he know if in fact he is not bringing together competitors to engage in a larger system of competition? Does the solidarity he seeks to achieve in organization still lead to competition and exploit--tion of other companies, the environment, and the consumer? Has long range competitive advantage been gained by joining competitors in the short run or is a new cooperative world view in the making? Further, we must raise some questions regarding the individual's behavior in the group.

When group members in a training group express strong emotions, is the human relations worker helping them become more authentic and genuine, or is he providing the current competitive system with a safety valve for siphoning off discontent? Does personal dissatisfaction become viewed as solely the fault and responsibility of the individual rather than as symptomatic of the underlying ills of a highly competitive system? Do the larger social system pressures that might be adversely affecting the individual become accountable? By posing such agonizing questions the human relations worker may better determine whether he is serving the interests of the status quo or if he is truly a "change agent."

The human relations movement has neither acknowledged nor attended to these issues. Instead, it has become uncritically popularized as a

source of social change. Pfeiffer and Jones state: "In recent years human relations training. . . the generic term for leadership development, encounter groups, T-groups, D-groups, awareness expansion, organizational development, etc., has become increasingly visible" (1969, p. 1). The thrust of this movement is to contribute to the development of humane institutions and personal growth for normal individuals (Bennis, Benne, Chin, 1969; Schein and Bennis, 1965). Carl Rogers, a leading American psychologist, has referred to it as the "most important social invention of this century. . . . The demand is utterly beyond belief" (1968, pp. 29-31). Yet despite its enormous popularity and growth, human relations training has not proved that the changes produced in its workshops are lasting and transferable to new situations.

Campbell and Dunette (1968) in a comprehensive review of forty-four research studies argue that there is no real evidence that T-group experience generalizes. Maliver (1971) in an article that strongly indicts the group movement as a profit-making cult describes its effect:

> Generally, the pattern of their group experience has been a wonderful, exhilarating high that lasts for two or three days, followed by a sudden and frightening depression. The exhilaration comes from having felt that within the group they were intimate with and related to other individuals. The depression occurs when the grouper realizes that he's back in the same old rut. (p. 40)

How is the human relations phenomena to be understood? It is revered by some as the means of transforming society, and chastized by others as a cult that serves the interests of profit rather than people. This analysis is undertaken in order to shed light on the human relations controversy and to explore its potential for social change. To further these ends, the following proposals have been made:

1. That human relations be studied in terms of its relationship to its social context;
2. That its capabilities and limitations as a force for social change be explored;
3. That guidelines be offered for the human relations movement which could increase its potential as a force for social change.

In order to accomplish this, a methodology with a social perspective will be developed. The rationale on the need for this methodology will be elaborated in Chapter II, in the summary of related literature. The methodology itself will be developed in Chapter III. The skeleton or outline of the methodology will consist of a series of five questions extracted from Mills (1959) The Sociological Imagination. The substantive part of the methodology will be answers to the issues raised by Mills (1959) as extracted from the writings of two contemporary social critics, Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964). These sources were chosen because their writings were seen as providing key insights into the social issues raised by laboratory education.

In Chapter IV, the methodology developed in Chapter III will be applied to an analysis of selected works of Kurt Lewin (1948) and Abraham Maslow (1965). I view these two social scientists as key representatives of the historical and philosophical background out of which current laboratory education practices have emerged.

In Chapter V, the methodology will be applied to analyze select works of two current practitioners of laboratory education: Chris Agyris (1970) and Donald Klein (1968). These practitioners were chosen because they exemplify attempts at applying laboratory education principles in work with large social systems.

Chapter VI will be the concluding chapter. The findings from the five previous chapters will be discussed and summarized, and the implications and limitations of this study will be considered.

CHAPTER II

SUMMARY OF RELATED LITERATURE

In this chapter the laboratory training model of human relations training will first be distinguished from other types of group approaches often confused with it. Laboratory training will then be discussed with special attention given to its historic commitment to social change and social action. The development of the laboratory training model, the assumptions behind this specialized field of human relations training, and research pertaining to its effectiveness as a vehicle for social change will be reviewed. The concluding section of this chapter will support the need for the development of a methodology with a greater "social perspective" in the field of laboratory training if it is to be an effective force for significant social change.

Definition of Terms

Before proceeding with a detailed discussion of laboratory training, an effort will be made to distinguish it from other types of group experiences which have become increasingly popular in recent years and are often confused with the laboratory method. Rather than use such earlier coined, generic terms as "sensitivity training" or "human relations training," Eddy and Lubin, 1971 and Lubin and Eddy, 1970 suggest the need for more exacting definitions of practices in the field. With the phenomenal growth of small group experiences, these earlier terms are now often used in a loose and vague manner to stand for a wide range

of groups which are diverse in their aims and practices.

The following are some of the definitions abstracted from Eddy and Lubin, 1971 and Lubin and Eddy, 1970 in an attempt to distinguish laboratory training from encounter groups, marathon groups, and group psychotherapy.

The laboratory training model refers to a range of experience-based learning activities in which participants are directly involved in goal setting, observing, feeding back their observations continuously, analyzing ongoing data, and planning for action based on their combined analysis. Thus "experiences" of participants within the laboratory situation itself provide the key material for learning.

The specific laboratory format itself may vary according to the goals to be accomplished within it. An essential element in most laboratories is the T-group ("T" for "training"). In the standard type of T-group, participants generally find themselves in a relatively unstructured situation, (a cultural vacuum), in which it is their responsibility to create out of their interactions in the group a culture which can help them meet their needs for support, feedback, and learning. The experiences and behavior exhibited by the participants as they attempt to grapple with this unique situation provide the data for analysis and learning. Thus T-group participants have an opportunity to learn how their behavior is seen by others; to become more sensitive to their feelings and the feelings and behavior of others; to gauge their effectiveness in playing various kinds of roles; and to develop methods for understanding individual, group, and organizational behavior dynamics.

A note of caution should be given, however. T-groups have at times become a synonym for "laboratory training," and vice versa. While

it is true that the T-group usually constitutes an essential component of laboratory training, it is not usually the only component. Generally, T-groups are augmented by integrating theory and skill exercise sessions which are designed to help participants develop the conceptual understanding (cognitive maps) and behavioral skills needed for them to generalize from and apply their experiences in non-laboratory situations.

Encounter groups usually refer to intensive small group experiences in which the emphasis is upon personal growth through expanding awareness, and the exploration of intrapsychic processes as well as interpersonal ones. There is relatively little focus on the group as a learning vehicle; the trainer takes a more active and direct role; intellectual understanding and conceptualization of experience are devalued; and more physical means of interaction are encouraged and utilized. Modes of expression and sensory exploration such as dance, art, massage, meditation, fantasy, and dream exploration are often used as part of an encounter group experience.

Marathon groups are generally time-extended encounter groups that use the accumulated experience and the accompanying fatigue to break through participants' defenses.

In summarizing distinctions among laboratory training, encounter groups, and group psychotherapy, Lubin and Eddy state:

> To recapitulate, laboratory training (including both the T-group with a group emphasis and the T-group with a personal-interpersonal emphasis) retains a strong tie to its origin as an educational method, is concerned with cognitive as well as affective learning, and values the ability of the participant to transfer learnings to the back-home situation. It differs from group psychotherapy (the form practiced in many adult outpatient clinics) in that lab participants are seen as relatively well-functioning individuals, repair and restoration of function are not among its objectives, the leader is less central to the process, and the perspective is upon current group developments and interpersonal transactions.

> The T-group with a personal-interpersonal emphasis resembles some encounter groups in some of the methods that are used, but it deals less with personal-historical material and has more of an educational focus. (1970, pp. 330-331)

Historical Overview of Laboratory Training

Appley and Winder (in press) offer the following rationale for the development of laboratory training:

> The laboratory movement, i.e., deliberate supervised small group human relations workshops such as those offered at Bethel by the organization to be called the National Training Laboratories, developed out of this grave concern of some educators and behavioral scientists who were interested in solving what they recognized as increasingly critical social problems, particularly in the area of human relations: problems caused by rapid technological growth, increased bureaucratization, and increased depersonalization. (p. 35)

> Over and over again, however, it will be apparent that one important difference between human relations and other re-educative alternatives is this commitment to the idea of what "might be"--a commitment to a set of values coupled with a spirit of inquiry tied to a scientific body of knowledge, and accompanied by the personal understanding by the scientist/practitioner that what is very much needed in society today is continuous planned change for organizational and institutional effectiveness plus the opportunity for individuals to have and maintain their integrity and exercise their influence. (p. 28)

> . . . Social change was seen as an urgent necessity, and training change agents an urgent need. (p. 29)

The beginning of laboratory training is usually traced to a workshop on intergroup relations held during the summer of 1946 in New Britain, Connecticut. The workshop was an interdisciplinary, collaborative effort whose staff consisted of several people considered to be in the vanguard of laboratory training, e.g., Kenneth Benne, Leland Bradford, Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt (Appley and Winder, [in press]; Lubin and Eddy, [1970]).

Appley and Winder (in press) describe the significant happening at this workshop:

> In that summer of 1946, some participants in the workshop were present as audience when the staff of the workshop met to discuss the

> behavior of the same participants as observed earlier in the day. These data had been gathered systematically on observation schedules by the research staff. However, discrepancies as well as confirmations of perceptions of the members' behavior and the group's interactions were soon shared by both audience and staff. And it was quickly recognized that feedback--the opportunity to give and receive personal perceptions of commonly shared data about each other's behavior and interactions--was a very exciting and powerful method for learning, and that the impact of this kind of exchange was very great. If changing attitudes and behaviors was an important goal at the workshop, here indeed was an important method. The workshop was henceforth qualitatively changed with the acceptance of that accidental innovation. (pp. 25-26)

The following summer, an experiential learning activity was intentionally designed into the workshop.

Lubin and Eddy (1970) describe the 1947 workshop:

> In 1947, with the direct sponsorship of the National Education Association and the Research Center for Group Dynamics of M.I.T., the above-named training staff organized a three-week summer session at Gould Academy in Bethel, Maine. An isolated "cultural island" location was selected because of Lewin's conviction that change was more likely if the usual situational forces which acted to resist change could be left behind.
>
> The Basic Skills Training Group (BST) was included in this three-week summer session. It contained an observer who fed back behavioral data for the group discussion. A staff member referred to as the training leader assisted the group to evaluate the observations made by the observer, as well as data supplied by the participants in the group. (1970, p. 308)

The Basic Skills Training Group Session was expected to be the vehicle through which people could gain some of the following competencies: (1) change agent skills and concepts; (2) increased understanding of self, group, and organizational dynamics; (3) deeper understanding of democratic principles; (4) diagnostic and trainer skills (Bradford, Gibb, Benne, 1964, pp. 85-87).

It soon became apparent that these goals could not be realistically accomplished in one three-week Basic Skills Training session. However, these earlier workshops became the catalyst for experimenting with

many diverse laboratory designs in future years. Hence, the Basic Skills Training session was modified and by 1947 would be called a T-group.

From 1949 on, Benne sees two distinct periods in T-groups laboratory training:

> The first period, roughly from 1949 through 1955, is marked by a variety of experimental attempts to create training formats and technologies to serve learning objectives seen as extraneous to those peculiarly within the province of the T-group. This led at times to virtual segregation of T-group activities. Separate groupings were formed for skill practice, for application of laboratory learnings, and for the study of change, among other activities. Sometimes, separate staff units for handling T-group activities and non-T-group activities were recruited. This experimentation was greatly aided by two large grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York for the development of NTL's program.
>
> The second period, roughly from 1956 to the present, is marked by efforts to reintegrate T-group experiences into the designs of laboratories. Experimentation with new designs and with new uses of T-groups continues. . . . It is during this time that numerous occupational laboratories developed, while the more traditional cross-occupational laboratories continued. Regional and other laboratory programs also developed under auspices other than NTL. (Bradford, Gibb, Benne, 1964, pp. 87-88)

Bradford (1967) supports Benne's earlier observations when he writes:

> During the 1950's, three trends came into being. Regional laboratories emerged autonomously--the Western Training Laboratory, the Pacific Northwest Laboratory, the Intermountain Laboratory for Group Development, and the Boston University Summer Laboratory. Some have now merged or collaborated with NTL, as a national program has steadily grown.
>
> The second trend was the development of occupational laboratory sessions held during the year--most notably in the fields of industry and religion. The industrial programs now number over fifteen each year.
>
> Another trend, beginning in the late 1950's, has been that NTL and Network members have increasingly been engaged as change agents in organizational growth and development. (p. 142)

Appley and Winder (in press) help us bridge the gap in the history of NTL from the 1950's to the 1970's with the following account:

> In the 1960's, recognition of these trends led to the reorganization of NTL into five centers: (1) Center for Organizational Studies, (2) Center for the Development of Educational Leadership; (3) Center for Community Affairs; (4) Center for the Development of Leadership in Government; (5) Center for International Training. These later (1970) became: (1) Center for Organizational Studies; (2) Center for the Development of Educational Leadership; (3) Center for Black Studies; (4) Center for a Voluntary Society. All are now part of the renamed NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Science. (p. 38)

Appley and Winder continue:

> . . . the NTL Institute does seem to have come back to affirming clearly its historical purpose in this recent statement:
>
> > The overriding purpose of NTL Institute is constructive societal change. Its programs focus on the development of individual and organizational dynamics to help create organizations that continually promote both personal and social growth. . . (p. 41)

Within these generalized goals of personal, group, and organizational development, Warren Bennis sees certain "meta-goals" or underlying values which shape and influence laboratory training. One such goal Bennis sees is expanded consciousness and recognition of choice. This "meta-goal" is achieved through a process described by Bennis in Golembiewski and Blumberg:

> . . . Laboratory training, then, realizes its meta-goal of "expanded consciousness and recognition of choice points" by way of a very complicated process: extracting participants from their day-to-day preoccupations, cultural insulation, and deroutinization. Parallel to and combined with this unfreezing process is an emphasis on awareness, sensitivity, and diagnosis, all of which encourage the participant to think about his behavior--most particularly to think about how he chooses to behave. (1970, p. 20)

Another meta-goal that Bennis refers to is a "spirit of inquiry" which he describes in the following manner:

> Closely related to the meta-goals of choice and, in fact, only conceptually separable is an attitude of inquiry associated with science. It is a complex of human behavior and adjustment that has been summed up as the "spirit of inquiry" and includes many elements. The first may be called the hypothetical spirit, the feeling for tentativeness and caution, the respect for probable error. Another is experimentalism, the willingness to expose ideas to emperical testing. The

exigencies of the laboratory situation help to create this orientation. (Golembiewski and Blumberg, 1970, p. 20)

A third meta-goal of laboratory training Bennis calls "authenticity in interpersonal relations:"

> An important imperative in laboratory training has to do with the relatively high valuation of feelings: their expression and their effects. The degree to which participants can commjnicate feelings and in turn evoke valid feelings from other members is regarded as an important criterion of group growth. One theory postulates that "group development involves the overcoming of obstacles to valid communication," i.e., where valid communication is defined as interpersonal communication free--as far as humanly possible--of distortion.
>
> Authenticity, "leveling," and "expressing feelings" comprise an important part of the laboratory argot, all of which can be summed up in a passage from King Lear: "Speak what you feel, not what we ought to say." (Golembiewski and Blumberg, 1970, p. 21)

The fourth and final meta-goal of laboratory education Bennis refers to as "a collaborative conception of the authority relationship."

> . . . most important is the realization that the teaching-learning process of laboratory training is a prototype of the collaborative conception of authority. Putting it differently, we can say that learning is accomplished through the requirements of the situation and a joint, collaborative venture between the trainer and participants. Also, there is the belief that participants can exercise self-control in the learning process; i.e., the participant accepts influence on the basis of his own evaluation rather than reliance on outside controls, such as rewards and punishments. Internalization, through credibility--rather than compliance, through exogenous controls--is the type of social influence employed in laboratory training. It is precisely this form of influence which holds for the collaborative conception of authority we have been discussing. (Golembiewski and Blumberg, 1970, pp. 22-23)

The "Yogi" Versus The "Commisar"

The main target or client system through which these meta-goals are to be realized has been debated in laboratory training. If the client is the individual, the stress tends to be on his own "personal growth" and interpersonal competence; to facilitate this the laboratory is generally

composed of an occupationally heterogeneous grouping of strangers. If the client is an organization, or some part of it, the stress of the laboratory tends to be directed toward developing the capabilities of the organization in such a way that the organization can attain and sustain an optimum level of performance. The name given to a laboratory set up for such organization development is an "organization training laboratory" and it usually involves a grouping of individuals from the same organization.

Since both the individual and the social system (i.e., organization or some subsystem) have been the foci of laboratory training, staff strategies and training designs have tended to examine either one or the other. Schein and Bennis see this difference in approach toward laboratory training as analogous to the distinction between the "Yogi" and the "Commisar" or, to be specific,

> . . . between those who turn inward for insight and nirvana and those who turn outward for social salvation. It is the difference between those who believe in the manipulation of external forces, such as legal, technological, economic, political factors and those who look to the personality, self-actualization of the individual for ultimate social improvement. (1965, p. 202)

According to Schein and Bennis (1965), ever since the existence of laboratory training almost all training designs and strategies have implicitly, or explicitly, reflected this conflict. The debate which has generated from this conflict has been useful insofar as it has raised for examination certain crucial issues such as: (1) the problem of transfer of learning from the laboratory culture to other cultures; (2) the relationship between personal growth and organizational improvement, if any; (3) the type of training design and laboratory strategy that shows the most potential for utility of training effects.

Argyris lends credence to the above first issue when he states:

> A major concern in laboratory training has been to create learning conditions that have as much transferability as possible to situations beyond the laboratory. Learning that is laboratory bounded is of interest, but it can be dangerous because the individual could leave, feeling that the only world that is a good one is the one in the laboratory. Such a conclusion would hardly lead to motivation to become interpersonally effective in the real world. (1967, p. 162)

Transfer of laboratory learning is defined by Valiquet (1968) as "the transmissibility of what is learned in the training situation to the customary work situation." Efforts to deal with the application of laboratory learning to back-home problems was one of the prime content areas in the original 1947-1948 laboratory programs, and still maintains its position in current literature as one of the central goals of the laboratory approach (Bradford, Gibb, and Benne, 1964; Lubin and Eddy, 1970; Eddy and Lubin, 1971).

Kenneth Benne has noted that the problem of how to promote transfer of laboratory learnings has been a particularly difficult one to solve: lectures seem to have had little lasting effect; consultation groups need time to get oriented and establish trust before any real work can begin (Bradford, Gibb, and Benne, 1964, pp. 18, 102). He observes that, in the face of manifold difficulties, the medium for consultation on back-home problems has fallen to the T-group. However it seems unlikely that in transferring the function to the T-group, the whole of the function is maintained (Bunker, 1967).

Edgar Schein's (Bennis, Schein, Berlew, and Steele, 1964; Schein and Bennis, 1965) analysis of the laboratory training process into freezing, changing, and refreezing components, based on the Lewinian (1958) model of change, provides a framework into which the results of studies

on the transfer of learning can be integrated. Refreezing, or the stabilization and integration on changes is postulated to occur primarily through two mechanisms: (1) integrating new responses into the personality, and (2) integrating new responses into significant ongoing relationships.

Bunker (1967) believes that the first mechanism for change postulated by Schein is a legitimate one for the T-group (by itself) to foster, but raises doubts about the ability of the T-group to facilitate the development of the second mechanism which has to do with the application of learning. Bunker (1967, p. 521) states:

> Although the T-group is a significant factor in integrating new responses into the personality, it is often antithetical to the integration of new responses into the back-home situation. The emphasis on the immediate interpersonal relationships and the negation of outside forces preclude the discussion of back-home problems.

Research findings which bear on the issue raised by Bunker (1967) about the back-home impact of T-group training show mixed, inconclusive results. Miles (1960, 1965), Boyd and Elliss (1962), Bunker (1965) have reported studies of on-the-job-changes on working style and interpersonal relations in which groups experiencing laboratory training were perceived by co-workers as having changed significantly more than control groups. On the other hand, Bennis (1965) uses the term "fade-out" to describe the disturbing lack of durability of training results when participants return to their company. Bennis (1963, p. 159) goes on to state:

> What remains clear is that T-group members who increased their interpersonal sensitivity as a result of the T-group had difficulty in transferring their learning in settings without T-group training. It is also clear that new tensions were generated between those individuals who attended laboratory training and those who did not.

Harrison (1962) reports that trainees increased their use of emotional and interpersonal descriptions of each other, but did not increase such descriptions of their fellow employees back home. He concludes that real changes in interpersonal perceptions can occur through laboratory training but there is a lack of transfer of perceptions to people not attending workshops. A study by Oshry and Harrison (1966) was done to find out whether the inward orientation of the T-group experience turns outward and has significance for the participant's work world. They found that although the participant becomes more sensitive and aware of interpersonal resources, he does not see these resources as being any more useful to him in the solution of his problems than he did before training.

Oshry and Harrison (1967, pp. 196-197) go on to conclude:

> As the manager stands on the threshold of reentry, transfer of learning has taken place only in the sense that he now diagnoses his interpersonal work world and his own role in it differently, but not in the sense that he seems prepared to export the action-model of the T-group to the solution of work problems.

A major conclusion that Bunker (1967) draws from the diverse findings on laboratory training is that organizationally relevant learning is not necessarily the same as personally relevant learning and at times the two may be incompatible.

The relationship between personal growth and organizational development is a complex one that is confounded by many factors. Hobb's (1962) in a well-reasoned argument, believes that personal insight is not enough; at least not enough relative to the potency of direct application planning. Bennis (1963) in referring to the writings of Alvin W. Gouldner, challenges the theoretical notion implicit in some laboratory

designs that individual insight alone resulting from a T-group experience can lead to more effective organization functioning.

A serious weakness that Gouldner (1961) sees in the insight approach alone is the lack of manipulability of the strategic variables. Gouldner goes on to say that it is not obvious that insight leads to sophistication in rearranging social systems or in making strategic organizational interventions. Gouldner believes that insight may lead to some personal manipulation of variables but it is doubtful that it can lead directly to external manipulation of social systems.

Bass sums up the relationship between personal growth and organizational improvement as follows:

> . . . the pure T-group experience may generate a great deal of individual development. The T-group may bring about increased commitment to social understanding, greater self-awareness, and greater acceptance of individuality. Yet collections of such more "mature" individuals may make less effective organizations. (1967, p. 221)

The reasons for Bass's pessimistic appraisal is that the destruction of the customary authority structure in the T-group in order to promote exploration and change in the individual participants, coupled with an emphasis on the values of democracy and consensus, may cause some laboratory participants to lose their confidence in using directive leadership which may be needed for organizational reasons.

Argyris (1967) believes that while values learned in laboratory setting may be different from most organizational values, the individual who has power and influence in his organization should be able to apply laboratory learning. A study by Matthew Miles (1965) supports Argyris' contention that the position a person holds within an organization affects the ease with which he is able to apply laboratory training. Miles

found that a perceived change score correlated with the security and the power of the position a participant held in his own organization. Rather than being entrenched and committed to the current structure and traditions of their organizations, people who had secure and powerful positions were able to feel free enough to attempt the new-laboratory learned-behaviors.

The ultimate issue for change agents is the determination of which approach to laboratory training offers the greatest potential for utilization of laboratory learning. The answer that seems to emanate from both theoretical approaches to planned change and empirical laboratory findings is that the "organizational training laboratory" shows the greatest potential utility.

Mann (1962) states in summarizing the disappointing results from non-organizationally oriented laboratory programs:

> At best, these studies suggest that this type of training has little or no general effect. . . . Training which does not take the trainee's regular social environment into account will probably have little chance of modifying behavior. It may very well be that human relations training--as a procedure for initiating social change--is most successful when it is designed to remold the whole system of role relationships. . . .

This point is strongly emphasized by Bennis, Benne, and Chin (1962, pp. 617-636) in their discussion of programs and technologies of planned change:

> Isolating the individual from his organizational context, his normative structure which rewards him and represents a significant reference group, makes no sense. In fact, if it sets up countervailing norms and expectations, it may be deleterious to both the organization and to the individual.

Several studies have described the relative effectiveness of organizationally oriented training laboratories in relatively closed

and controlled systems. The following is a list of some such studies: Argyris, 1964; Beckhard, 1966; Bennis, 1965; Blake, Mouton, Barnes, and Greiner, 1964; Davis, 1967; Friedlander, 1967, 1968; Morton, 1964; Winn, 1966.

Several main conclusions emerge from these studies:

1. The T-group experience is a means to an end, not an end in itself. There is a need for job related, problem-oriented activities if lasting organizational change is to come about.
2. The composition of a laboratory group that most closely resembles the "natural" or actual work group show the greatest potential for affecting the organization.
3. For change to occur most effectively in an organization, the laboratory program needs to be an organic one; that is, it should grow out of the needs identified as relevant to the organization's purposes.
4. Laboratory transfer of learning is greatest when values of the laboratory are congruent with organizations.
5. Most effective organization development programs are those that place a heavy emphasis on pre-laboratory and post-laboratory work as well as the laboratory experience itself.

However, other studies suggest that the overall effectiveness of organizationally oriented laboratories is still in doubt. Campbell and Dunette (1968) in a comprehensive review of forty-four research studies that examined the effectiveness of T-group experiences for managerial training and development offered the following conclusions:

> Examination of the research literature leads to the conclusion that while T-group training seems to produce observable changes in behavior,

> the utility of these changes for the performance of individuals in their organizational roles remains to be demonstrated. (p. 73)
>
> To sum up, the assumption that T-group training has positive utility for organizations must necessarily rest on shaky ground. It has been neither confirmed nor disconfirmed. The authors wish to emphasize again that utility for the organization is not necessarily the same as utility for the individual. (p. 101)

Buchanan (1969) in a review of published studies between 1964 and May of 1968 on laboratory training in organizationally-oriented programs offers the following inconclusive summaries:

1. It facilitates personal growth and development, and thus can be of value to the individual who participates.

2. It accomplishes changes in individuals which according to several theories, are important in effecting change in organizations and in effectively managing organizations.

3. One study, in which an instrumented laboratory was compared with sensitivity training, provides some indication that more organizational change resulted from the instrumented approach.

4. The finding from this literature search are compatible with the conclusions reached in a similar review made four years ago. (p. 477)

In that review in 1965, Buchanan had come to the following conclusions:

1. Laboratory training is effective as a means of facilitating specifiable changes in individuals in the industrial setting.

2. It has been used effectively in some programs of organizational development, but not in others.

3. Behavioral scientists associated with the National Training Laboratories are actively engaged in subjecting their theories and methods to systematic analysis, and in developing strategies for organization development.

4. Some of these strategies, now being studied systematically, are showing exciting results. (Buchanan, 1969, p. 466)

The results of using organizationally-oriented laboratories in large, pluralistic systems have been basically ineffective. Bennis (1969) states:

> Organization development seems most appropriate under conditions of trust, truth, love, and collaboration. But what about conditions of war, conflict, dissent, and violence?
>
> For, fundamentally, the organization development consultant tends to use the truth-love model when it may be inappropriate and has no alternative model to guide his practice under conditions of distrust, violence, and conflict. Essentially, this means that in pluralistic power situations, in situations which are not easily controlled, organization development practice may not reach its desired goals. . . . Organization development, to my knowledge, has not met with success in diffuse power structures such as cities, large-scale national organizations, or the urban ghetto. (pp. 77-78)

Luke and Seashore seem to support Bennis' contention when they state:

> . . . The simulation of large group and organizational problems in the laboratory setting has been much more difficult than the personal, interpersonal, or small group level concerns. The development of training designs that deal with the "hard-headed" concepts such as power, influence, and conflict has been more difficult than the development of designs which explore the "soft-headed" variables such as love, warmth, and trust. (in Golembiewski and Blumberg, 1970, p. 434)

Appley and Winder (in press) in describing Leland Bradford's hopes and concerns for the future of NTL while he was still its director state:

> He saw as "good developments" the spread of experience-based methods of learning; the rapid increase in network affiliation; the autonomous growth of centers and the regional organizations; and a somewhat more controversial development, that individuals with more power and influence were coming to NTL for training and consultation. He was less happy that NTL has had so little collaboration or influence in professional schools, except in schools of business administration; that NTL has not had much impact in the teaching of the behavioral sciences except through its own network; and that NTL has not had much influence on solutions to current social problems. (p. 38)

The Laboratory Culture Versus Society

Why has not human relations principles been successfully applied in pluralistic situations--in society at large? The argument to be

developed here is that the problems with which human relations workers are faced are not simply limited to people learning a set of attitudes and skills that they can then readily adapt to their home environment. Rather, human relations training is actually training in a cooperative micro-culture, the values of which are quite unlike those of the dominant culture. Such a cooperative micro-culture, extolling the virtues of trust, openness, and collaboration, prospers in an environment of abundance and minimal threat; it stands in sharp contradiction to the survival-oriented environment and economy predominating American society (Appley and Winder, [in press]; Henry, 1963; Shepard, 1965, 1970; Slater, 1970).

Slater (1970) in discussing the development of a new youth counter-culture in this society states:

> The old culture, when forced to choose, tends to give preference to property rights over personal rights, technological requirements over human needs, competition over cooperation, violence over sexuality, concentration over distribution, the producer over the consumer, means over ends, secrecy over openness, social forms over personal expression, striving over gratification, Oedipal love over communal love, and so on. The new counterculture tends to reverse all of these priorities. (p. 100)

Shepard (1970) develops his thesis of personal growth laboratories as an alternative culture:

> A personal growth laboratory creates an interpersonal world which disconfirms much of what people have learned in the world outside, affirms the possibility of a different world outside, and provides a partial model of what it could be like.
>
> A personal growth laboratory is an experimental test of the notion that mechanistic mentality and culture can be transcended. It is a resocializing institution, providing conditions that disconfirm some mechanistic assumptions and affirm some different views of the self in relation to others. (pp. 260, 263)

What happens to these threateningly subversive values learned in personal growth laboratories? What happens to this potentially alternative

culture that was developing in the personal growth laboratories?

Shepard (1970) offers some clues:

> Personal growth laboratories give an experience of a better order. It does not last beyond the end of the laboratory because the laboratory is a temporary little world that is insulated from the everyday world. Experiments show what happens under controlled conditions, but it is a long way from the laboratory to the marketplace. (p. 259)

> Even those who can formulate the new social reality rarely achieve any clarity about the conditions under which it might be established in the everyday world. The alienating forces they brought with them to the laboratory have largely disappeared, but they have been insulated from the alienating forces outside the laboratory. The truths of the laboratory culture are self-sustaining or self-fulfilling truths. Under laboratory conditions, openness breeds openness. When the individual returns to the interlocking systems of mechanistic society, he is confronted again with <u>its</u> self-sustaining, self-fulfilling system of truth. Closedness breeds closedness. (p. 264)

From Shepard's description, one sees that these potentially revolutionary values tend to remain isolated and insulated from the realities of the larger social system. Slater (1970) offers us some insight into this process:

> One of the basic characteristics of all successful social systems--indeed, perhaps all living matter as well--is that they include devices that serve to keep alive alternatives that are antithetical to their dominant emphases, as a kind of ledge against change. These latent alternatives usually persist in some encapsulated and imprisoned form. . . . (pp. 110-111)

A way laboratory education can persist in an encapsulated form is as a technology that is coopted to achieve current system goals.

Appley and Winder state:

> A danger that is rarely, if ever, warned against, however, is one the authors wish to re-emphasize; the danger is that the values which these reeducation innovations were intended to preserve will be lost as the technology is coopted by those who do not understand that as Bradford et al say on the first page of their book: "a T-group is more than a technology. . ."
>
> It has its roots in a system of values relative to mature, productive, and right relationships among people. . . . (in press, p. 40)

An example of how laboratory training can be coopted is by downplaying its overall value commitment and stressing its pragmatic use. Thomas Greening shows us the way:

> For example, let us briefly consider one criticism of sensitivity training that crops up again and again. These programs, their opponents charge, are naive and unilateral attempts to make people more open, more trusting, and more sensitive to the feeling of others, and to increase egalitarian democracy in business without regard for the realities of business life.
>
> Actually, this criticism is based, for the most part, on misinterpretation of the goals of sensitivity training. In fact, most sophisticated trainers now go out of their way to avoid championing any one particular mode of behavior by the participants. It's true that early leaders in the group dynamics field did place somewhat excessive emphasis on democratic permissiveness as a panacea; but few workers in this field cling to the simple belief that sensitivity training should aim solely at bringing about increased openness, trust, harmonious human relations, and egalitarian cooperation. Rather, the view now is that laboratory training can help to increase the participants' capacity to select more flexible and more realistic modes of behavior on the basis of discerning assessment of their own goals and needs and the interpersonal and task situation that confronts them. (In Siroka, Siroka, and Schloss, 1971, pp. 175-176)

Another example of how human relations workers can serve current system ends rather than work for change is quoted by Wolfe (1970) citing George Leonard in Education and Ecstasy.

> In the simplest kind of encounter groups, people learn to change their modes of relating and expressing themselves in a surprisingly short time. . . . It is significant that business and industry--especially the aerospace industry--sponsor a large share of these groups. Many management theorists believe that the usual efforts to scheme, manipulate and disguise true feelings waste better than fifty percent of the average executive's energy and time. Then, too, the intricate task of creating a spacecraft requires far more trust, candor and sensitivity than did the old production line. Corporations pursue an expanded human ability to express feelings and relate with others, not for altruism's sake, but for higher profits. (p. 29)

Along with the dangers of cooptation, the field of laboratory education must contend with the fact that highly competitive, survival-oriented behavior is often functional (though not necessarily psychologically

healthy), given the realities of our larger social system. Argyris states:

> If the situation in which the individual is placed is confirmed as threatening, then closedness may be a functional response. Individuals may become more closed for social reasons. Empirical evidence has been presented (Argyris, 1962, 1965, 1966) that there seems to be a general tendency for people to create social systems that are closed and reward survival orientations. It is therefore possible for the individual to behave in a closed manner because it makes sense; it is functional in a closed system. (In Golembiewski and Blumberg, 1970, p. 235)

Odiome, with a touch of sarcasm, describes these encompassing realities that the field of laboratory training has yet to "fully" confront.

> The real flaw in sensitivity training is that it isn't consistent with business and the economic world we live in. We are trapped in our own standard of living. We may struggle through proofs that the new participative styles of management are more productive than autocratic styles, but then there crops up General Motors which is built upon tight technical organization and tight discipline, being the most successful corporation that ever existed.
>
> Business is primarily an economic institution into which the inputs are materials and supplies, labor, and beginning capital. Through the process of production we obtain outputs of goods and services and ending capital. The objective of this output is profit from which comes growth and survival of the firm, and brings about the end product of it all which is consumption.
>
> Even the new utopians are caught in this trap. They are experts at consumption like the rest of us. I once heard of a study which proved that people don't work for money alone. I invited the researcher who had done the study to speak at a conference. I found that he wanted $500 to make the speech and when I sadly reported that we couldn't afford it, he wouldn't come. If you have tried to get a good human relations trainer for your company's training program these days, you know that the rates are from a minimum of $250 a day up to $750 (for the man whose researches prove more about the idealistic nature of man than the lower priced one. (In Golembiewski and Blumberg, 1970, pp. 285-286)

A clue to what the field of laboratory training must strive for on an increasingly larger social scale if it wishes to change the current conditions in our culture favoring a highly competitive, survival

orientation comes from observations on the optimal conditions for growth and development in the T-group.

Appley and Winder state:

> The first task of the trainer is to arrange the early environment in such a way that these explorations can take place, i.e., to help create a collaborative growth oriented learning environment through what he does and says and is which is different from the everyday competitive survival oriented environment which is the world back home for the participants. (in press, p. 122)

Appley and Winder continue:

> Given a climate of threat to self-esteem, competition, etc., a survival orientation is engaged (2) and individuals become defensive and fall back on their traditional role related behaviors. It is important to create an environment in which "survival" is not the issue; an environment in which "people's general tendency toward optimal exploration and variety. . ." might be set in motion. (in press, p. 124)

What these observations hint at is that the laboratory culture exists as latent alternative to society's current survival orientation. How to make the laboratory culture into a viable social alternative has become an issue of concern for many people. Support for the position that laboratory training must become involved with larger social system issues in order to be an effective force for the type of social change it advocates is found in recent literature.

Lubin and Eddy state:

> . . . the future of laboratory training will be concerned with broader issues. Predictable developments can be seen in the areas of system change, organizational development, temporary systems, social issues, and the new university. (1970, p. 332)

Lubin and Eddy continue:

> The focus of change and development has begun to shift more directly from the individual to the social system within which he functions. There is growing consensus that re-education and behavior change are unlikely to endure unless the back-home environment supports and reinforces the new behavior and encourages continuing development. Thus, approaches that deal with changing the operations and norms of systems are being explored. (1970, p. 333)

Appley and Winder state:

> Still another development has to do with the new and/or renewed commitment of behavioral scientists to working on social problems and the recognition that this means working through small groups as well. All of these developments point to the increasing need for competent lab trainers and change facilitators, whose value system is firmly based in the laboratory method. (in press, pp. 273-274)

With the recognition of the need for laboratory trainers to get involved with larger social issues and systems, there is a concomitant need for laboratory education to develop methodologies with a greater social consciousness and perspective, in order to analyze the effectiveness of their enlarged efforts. The next chapter is an attempt to meet this need by offering a socially oriented methodology.

Conclusion

This chapter had as its goal an attempt to distinguish laboratory training from other group approaches, and to trace its commitment to social change and review its overall effectiveness. An analysis of research findings on the effectiveness of laboratory training in improving small systems (e.g. individuals, small groups, simple organizations) yields inconclusive results. The effectiveness of laboratory training in changing large pluralistic systems--in society at large--has been quite limited. The reasons for its minimal social change utility can now be summarized.

If laboratory training is to be seen as a force for social change, then it must be understood in relation to its larger social context. When one does this one finds that laboratory training (i.e., training in a cooperative culture) is taking place within a highly competitive, survival-oriented culture. Secondly, society manages to

resist and contain the laboratory movement by allowing it to exist in an isolated and encapsulated form. In this way, laboratory training serves the interests of the existing social order (e.g. industry, government, etc.) and is a palliative in the form of a technology offered by society for the dual purpose of serving its own product ends (e.g. profit, productivity) while simultaneously hiding its pathology. Thirdly, within its alternative status there exists the potential for laboratory training to effect change in the social order if it can develop a consciousness and a cohesively organized form to express the oppositional yet dormant values which it holds.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY: SOCIAL-EXPERIENTIAL-CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The conceptual underpinnings for this study will rely mainly on the following three perspectives:

1. A social perspective as developed by Mills (1959) in his book, The Sociological Imagination;
2. An experiential perspective as employed by Laing (1965) Mystification, Confusion, and Conflict, (1967) The Politics of Experience;
3. A critical perspective as developed by Marcuse (1964) in One Dimensional Man.

Mills tells us that people are seldom aware of the close connections between the problems they experience in their daily lives and the structural problems of the society of which they are a part. What results is that people feel impotent and trapped by the rapidity and impersonality of the changes around them over which they believe they can have no control over. They experience their sufferings as private, and feel isolated from the grieving of others.

According to Mills in the Sociological Imagination,

> The first fruit of this imagination and the first lessons of the social science that embodies it--is the idea that the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his own fate only be locating himself within his period, that he can know his own chances in life only by becoming aware of those of all individuals in his circumstance. . . . We have come to know that every individual lives, from one generation to the next, in some society; that he lives out of biography, and that he lives it out within some historical sequence. (1959, p. 12)

The most essential tool for applying Mills' sociological imagination rests with grasping the distinction he makes between personal troubles and public issues. Mills tells us that troubles occur between the individual and his immediate range of experiences. Accordingly, the statement of the problem and the range of solutions to his troubles lie within the individual and immediate relations with others, and take place within the scope of his immediate environment. A trouble is then a private and personal matter. In contrast, issues have to do with matters that go beyond the immediate environment of the individual and his range of experiences. Issues have to do with the organization of many environments and the institutions that service them, and the interrelationships that exist between them and the larger social system. An issue is a public matter, a value cherished by society at large which is felt to be threatened. An issue therefore, cannot be defined in the personal and private terms which are applicable to the definition of troubles. An issue often involves a problem with institutional arrangements and with the structural contradictions or oppositional tendencies that exist within and between them (Mills, 1959, pp. 12-15). Mills states:

> In these terms consider unemployment. When, in a city of 100,000, only one man is unemployed, that is his personal trouble, and for its relief we properly look to the character of the man, his skills, and his immediate opportunities. But when in a nation of fifty million employees, fifteen million men are unemployed, that is an issue, and we may not hope to find its solution within the range of opportunities open to any one individual. The very structure of opportunities has collapsed. Both the correct statement of the problem and the range of possible solutions require us to consider the economic and political institutions of the society, and not merely the personal situation and character of a scatter of individuals. (1959, p. 15)

Mills continues:

> Consider marriage. Inside a marriage a man and a woman may experience personal troubles, but when the divorce rate during the first four years of marriage is 250 out of every 1,000 attempts, this is an indication of a structural issue having to do with the institutions of marriage and the family and other institutions that bear upon them. (1959, p. 16)

Mills concludes:

> In so far as an economy is so arranged that slumps occur, the problem of unemployment becomes incapable of personal solution. In so far as war is inherent in the nation-state system and in the uneven industrialization of the world, the ordinary individual in his restricted milieu will be powerless--with or without psychiatric aid--to solve the troubles which system or lack of system imposes upon him. If so far as the family as an institution turns women into darling little slaves and men into their chief providers and unweaned independents, the problem of a satisfactory marriage remains incapable of purely private solution. In so far as the overdeveloped megalopolis and the overdeveloped automobile are built-in features of the overdeveloped society, the issues of urban living will not be solved by personal ingenuity and private wealth. (1959, pp. 16-17)

The task that Mills sees for the social scientist is to translate personal troubles into public issues and public issues into terms that are relevant to the lives of individuals. To be able to do this is to possess what Mills calls "the sociological imagination."

Cannot the field of human relations be understood in terms of Mills' perspective? Since close to six million people have experienced enough frustration and alienation with our society to want intensive group experiences (Maliver, 1971) the problem translates itself from a personal trouble of a scatter of individuals to a public indictment of society. Hence the statement of the problem and the range of solutions which human relations workers must be sensitive to might extend to include the type of sociological imagination that Mills advocates.

To sharpen our ability to analyze problems, Mills outlines the following procedure:

> The formulation of problems, then, should include explicit attention to a range of public issues and of personal troubles; and they should open up for inquiry the causal connections between milieux and social structure. In our formulation of problems we must make clear the values that are really threatened in the troubles and issues involved, who accepts them as values, and by whom or by what they are threatened. Such formulations are often greatly complicated by the fact that the values found to be imperiled are not always those which individuals and publics believe to be imperiled, or at any rate are not the only ones. (1959, p. 145)

Mills goes on:

> It is quite necessary to take these values and feelings, arguments and fears, into our formulation of the problem, for such beliefs and expectations, however inadequate and mistaken they may be, are the very stuff of issues and troubles. Moreover, the answer to the problem, if any, is to be tested in part by its usefulness in explaining troubles and issues as they are experienced. (1959, pp. 145-146)

And Mills concludes:

> Any adequate "answer" to a problem, in turn, will contain a view of the strategic points of intervention--of the "levers" by which the structure may be maintained or changed; and an assessment of those who are in a position to intervene but are not doing so. (1959, p. 146)

To help the laboratory trainer in further applying Mills' analysis, I have delineated the components of his approach to problem formulation and solution into the following questions:

1. What values are really threatened in our present society?
2. By whom or by what are these values threatened?
3. What is the connection between the threat to these values and their manifestation in terms of personal troubles and public issues?
4. Are people generally aware and concerned about the threat to these values, or do they define the personal troubles and public issues they experience in terms of other values?
5. What are the levers for change?

Mills' analysis provides us with a framework to analyze social issues. Marcuse (1964) and Laing (1965, 1967) were chosen to add substance to this framework. Their writings provide important insights into the social context and issues that surround laboratory training.

Laing (1965, 1967) tells us that the nature of our experiences must be seen in relationship to the social and political context of which we are a part. The meaning and role of experiences are to be understood in relationship to the social processes we undergo and the relevant social context within which we live out our lives. Since laboratory training makes strong use of experiential learning, and laboratory training is better understood when related to its social context, it is felt that the methodology being developed could benefit from such concepts that help us understand the social basis of experience (Laing, 1965, 1967).

Marcuse (1964) was chosen to be a part of this methodology because, in "One Dimensional Man," he helps us understand that a major hope for change in society lies in the possible but repressed alternatives which, if allowed to emerge, would contradict the existing social order and offer the potential for greater human development. Hence, what is critical in the Marcusian sense is the notion that repressed alternatives exist in our society which, if liberated, have the potential to change that society. The laboratory education movement is seen as an example of such a repressed alternative that offers the possibility of becoming a viable force for change.

I will now attempt to answer the five questions derived from Mills by referring to the writings of Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964).

1. What values are really threatened in our present society?

Laing (1967) and Marcuse (1964) tell us that we are estranged and alienated from the full possibilities of our human potential. The wholeness of being human as marked by the ability to love, to play, to work constructively (rather than destructively), to share and relate to each other's experience and one's own inner world (e.g. fantasy life, dreams, body sensations) is decimated in our current society. Our society is not using our intellectual and material resources in such a manner that it could bring about the optimal free development and satisfaction of individual needs with a minimum of toil and misery. Such optimal development is referred to by Marcuse as the "pacification of existence," which he sees as the ultimate goal of a humane and free society.

Laing offers us the following illustration of the decimation of our potential:

> As adults, we have forgotten most of our childhood, not only its contents but its flavor; as men of the world, we hardly know of the existence of the inner world; we barely remember our dreams, and make little sense of them when we do. As for our bodies, we retain just sufficient proprioceptive sensations to coordinate our movements and to ensure the minimal requirements for biosocial survival--to register fatigue, signals for food, sex, defecation, sleep; beyond that, little or nothing. Our capacity to think, except in the service of what we are dangerously deluded in supposing is our self-interest and in conformity with common sense, is pitifully limited; our capacity even to see, hear, touch, taste and smell is so shrouded in veils of mystification that an intensive discipline of unlearning is necessary for anyone before one can begin to experience the world afresh, with innocence, truth and love. (1967, p. 26)

In addition to our estrangement from the full range of our potential, the individual's self-determination and personal uniqueness are limited by a society which places blinders on his freedom of mind, spirit, and choice. Rather than having authentic cultural pluralism, we have

cultural indoctrination where society's present values and priorities become synonymous with individual needs and choices.

Marcuse tells us that our society replaces personal freedom of choice and self-determination with an "administered good life" where pseudo-individualism and pseudo-choice reign. As Marcuse observes:

> The distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is its effective suffocation of those needs which demand liberation--liberation also from that which is tolerable and rewarding and comfortable--while it sustains and absolves the destructive power and repressive function of the affluent society. Here, the social controls exact the overwhelming need for the production and consumption of waste; the need for stupefying work where it is no longer a real necessity; the need for modes of relaxation which soothe and prolong this stupefication; the need for maintaining such deceptive liberties as free competition at administered prices, a free press which censors itself, free choice between brands and gadgets.
>
> Under the rule of a repressive whole, liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination. The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual. The criterion for free choice can never be an absolute one, but neither is it entirely relative. Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear--that is, if they sustain alienation. And the spontaneous reproduction of superimposed needs by the individual does not establish autonomy; it only testifies to the efficacy of the controls. (1964, pp. 7-8)

Marcuse continues in the same vein:

> The growing productivity of labor creates an increasing surplus-product which, whether privately or centrally appropriated and distributed, allows an increased consumption--notwithstanding the increased diversion of productivity. As long as this constellation prevails, it reduces the use-value of freedom; there is no reason to insist on self-determination if the administered life is the comfortable and even the "good" life. This is the rational and material ground for the unification of opposites, for one-dimensional political behavior. On this ground, the transcending political forces within society are arrested, and qualitative change appears possible only as a change from without. (1964, p. 49)

Hence, one sees that the value that is ultimately threatened is "qualitative social change." Only in this way would a greater degree of self-determination and maximization of human potential be possible on a public level. Marcuse states:

> . . . Technical progress, extended to a whole system of domination and coordination, creates forms of life (and of power) which appear to reconcile the forces opposing the system and to defeat or refute all protest in the name of the historical prospects of freedom from toil and domination. Contemporary society seems to be capable of containing social change--qualitative change which would establish essentially different institutions, a new direction of the productive process, new modes of human existence. This containment of social change is perhaps the most singular achievement of advanced industrial society; the general acceptance of the National Purpose, bipartisan policy, the decline of pluralism, the collusion of Business and Labor within the strong State testify to the integration of opposites which is the result as well as the prerequisite of this achievement. (1964, xii, Introduction)

Marcuse illustrates how our society works against qualitative social change by defining progress in terms of expanding production and consumption, in old directions with old priorities through old institutions.

> Today's fight against historical alternative finds a firm mass basis in the underlying population, and finds its ideology in the rigid orientation of thought and behavior to the given universe of facts. Validated by the accomplishments of science and technology, justified by its growing productivity, the status quo defies all transcendence. Faced with the possibility of pacification on the grounds of its technical and intellectual achievements, the mature industrial society closes itself against this alternative. . .
>
> . . . The most advanced areas of industrial society exhibit throughout these two features: a trend toward consummation of technological rationality, and intensive efforts to contain this trend within the established institutions. Here is the internal contradiction of this civilization: the irrational element in its rationality. . . . Organization for peace is different from organization for war; the institutions which served the struggle for existence cannot serve the pacification of existence. Life as an end is qualitatively different from life as a means. (1964, p. 17)

In summary, the following three values are threatened in our present society:

A. Full possibilities of maximizing our human potential;

B. Authentic cultural pluralism and its accompanying self-determination and freedom of choice;

C. Qualitative social change which would permit the above values to be actualized on a public scale and would establish different institutions, a new direction for the productive process, and new modes of human existence.

2. By whom or by what are these values threatened?

Marcuse offers us the beginnings of an answer to this question when he discusses our current technological system. The present system, in his view, is characterized by the following features: it is based on administered controls over the individual whom it molds and conditions to fit in with its current technological needs and priorities, a technology which dominates, mystifies, and bribes people by its (1) ever increasing standard of living; (2) higher levels of production and consumption; and (3) implantation of new varieties of false needs to consume and produce that which maintains and sustains a scarcity, survival-oriented social environment. Marcuse states:

> In this society, the productive apparatus tends to become totalitarian to the extent to which it determines not only the socially needed occupations, skills, and attitudes, but also individual needs and aspirations. It thus obliterates the opposition between the private and public existence, between individual and social needs. Technology serves to institute new, more effective and more pleasant forms of social control and social cohesion. (1964, p. xv, Introduction)

Marcuse describes the conditioning process through which our current technological rationality sustains and perpetuates itself.

> The most effective and enduring form of warfare against liberation is the implanting of material and intellectual needs that perpetuate obsolete forms of the struggle for existence. The intensity, the satisfaction and even the character of human needs, beyond the biological level, have always been preconditioned. Whether or not the possibility of doing or leaving, enjoying or destroying, possessing or rejecting something is seized as a need depends on whether or not it can be seen as desirable and necessary for the prevailing societal institutions and interests. In this sense, human needs are historical needs and, to the extent to which the society demands the repressive development of the individual, his needs themselves and their claim for satisfaction are subject to overriding critical standards. (1964, p. 4)

Marcuse elaborates elsewhere:

> . . . It is repressive precisely to the degree to which it promotes the satisfaction of needs which require continuing the rat race of catching up with one's peers and with planned obsolescence, enjoying freedom from using the brain, working with and for the means of destruction. The obvious comforts generated by this sort of productivity, and even more, the support which it gives to a system of profitable domination, facilitates its importation in less advanced areas of the world where the introduction of such a system still means tremendous progress in technical and human terms. (1964, p. 241)

Marcuse describes the end product and predicament produced by this process:

> Thus the question once again must be faced: How can the administered individuals--who have made their mutilation into their own liberties and satisfactions, and thus reproduce it on an enlarged scale--liberate themselves from themselves as well as from their masters? How is it even thinkable that the vicious circle be broken? (1964, pp. 250-251)

Laing describes how through the process of socialization we teach children to experience and act selectively in keeping with the moral values of our current society:

> We act on our experience at the behest of the others, just as we learn how to behave in compliance with them. We are taught what to experience and what not to experience, as we are taught what movements to make and what sounds to emit. A child of two is already a moral mover and moral talker and moral experiencer. He

> already moves the "right" way, makes the "right" noises, and knows what he should feel and what he should not feel. His movements have become stereometric types, enabling the specialist anthropologist to identify, through his rhythm and style, his national, even his regional, characteristics. As he is taught to move in specific ways out of the whole range of possible movements, so he is taught to experience out of the whole range of possible experience. (1967, pp. 59-60)

Laing goes on to show how, through the mechanisms of our primary socialization agencies of the family and school system, our personal relationships are molded to take on the qualities demanded by our current society, e.g. security mindedness, status, competitiveness.

In the following example, Laing discusses Jules Henry's (1963) analysis of how the American school system teaches win/lose competition:

> In a society where competition for the basic cultural goods is a pivot of action, people cannot be taught to love one another. It thus becomes necessary for the school to teach children how to hate, and without appearing to do so, for our culture cannot tolerate the idea that babes should hate each other. How does the school accomplish this ambiguity?

Here is another example given by Henry:

> Boris had trouble reducing 12/16 to the lowest terms, and could only get as far as 6/8. The teacher asked him quietly if that was as far as he could reduce it. She suggested he "think." Much heaving up and down and waving of hands by the other children, all frantic to correct him. Boris pretty unhappy, probably mentally paralyzed. The teacher quiet, patient, ignores the others and concentrates with look and voice on Boris. After a minute or two, she turns to the class and says, "Well, who can tell Boris what the number is?" A forest of hands appears, and the teacher calls Peggy. Peggy says that four may be divided into the numerator and the denominator.

Henry comments:

> Boris' failure made it possible for Peggy to succeed; his misery is the occasion for her rejoicing. This is a standard condition of the contemporary American elementary school. To a Zuni, Hopi or Dakota Indian, Peggy's performance would seem cruel beyond belief, for competition, the wringing of success from somebody's failure is a form of torture foreign to those non-competitive cultures. (1967, pp. 69-70)

In summary, the values referred to in Question 1 are threatened in the following way:

A. By the domination of a self-perpetuating, survival-scarcity oriented technology with its concomitant means of production and distribution;

B. By collaborating socialization mechanisms (e.g. family, school system, etc.) where competitive, survival-oriented skills, attitudes, and roles are taught, rewarded, and eventually internalized in people;

C. By alienated and brutalized people who through action, attitude, and social role perpetuate repressive needs, repressive consciousness, and repressive institutions.

3. What is the connection between the threat to these values and their manifestation in terms of personal trouble and public issues?

Laing identifies the source of the pervasive personal troubles of our age as the estrangement of our selves from our own inner states and feelings and from each other's. Laing calls this "alienation" and describes some of its manifestations:

> . . .disturbed and disturbing patterns of communications reflect the disarray of personal worlds of experience whose repression, denial, splitting, introjection, projection, etc.--whose general desecration and profanation--our civilization is based upon.
>
> When our personal worlds are rediscovered and allowed to reconstitute themselves, we first discover a shambles. Bodies half-dead; genitals dissociated from heart; heart severed from head; head dissociated from genitals. Without inner unity, with just enough sense of continuity to clutch at identity--the current idolatry. Torn--body, mind and spirit--by inner contradictions, pulled in different directions. Man cut off from his own mind, cut off equally from his own body--a half-crazed creature in a mad world. (1967, p. 55)

> The others have become installed in our hearts, and we call them ourselves. Each person, not being himself either to himself or the other, just as the other is not himself to himself or to us, in being another for another neither recognizes himself in the other, nor the other in himself. Hence, being at least a double absence, haunted by the ghost of his own murdered self, no wonder modern man is addicted to other persons, and the more addicted, the less satisfied, the more lonely. (1967, p. 74)

The translation of this sense of personal alienation into the public and social issues that it relates to is often short-circuited so that the problem and solutions to alienation remain defined in personal terms. This occurs because the single situation or particular case rather than the social system issues which they are related to often becomes the object of treatment.

Marcuse uses the field of human relations to show how personal troubles can become isolated from the social system issues which helped cause the problem.

> I shall take as an example a "classic" of industrial sociology: the study of labor relations in the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company.[1] It is an old study, undertaken about a quarter of a century ago, and methods have since been much refined. But in my opinion, their substance and function have remained the same. Moreover, this mode of thought has since not only spread into other branches of social science and into philosophy, but it has also helped to shape the human subjects with whom it is concerned. The operational concepts terminate in methods of improved social control; they become part of the science of management, Department of Human Relations.

Marcuse gives the following example:

> . . . a worker B makes the general statement that the piece rates on his job are too low. The interview reveals that "his wife is in the hospital and that he is worried about the doctor's bills he has incurred. In this case, the latent content of the complaint consists of the fact that B's present earnings, due to his wife's illness, are insufficient to meet his current financial obligations."

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[1]The quotations are from Roethlisberger and Dickinson, Management and the Worker. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947).

> Such translation changes significantly the meaning of the actual proposition. The untranslated statement formulates a general condition in its generality ("wages are too low"). It goes beyond the particular condition in the particular factor and beyond the worker's particular situation. In this generality, and only in this generality, the statement expresses a sweeping indictment which takes the particular case as a manifestation of a universal state of affairs, and insinuates that the latter might not be changed by the improvement of the former.
>
> Thus the untranslated statement established a concrete relation between the particular case and the whole of which it is a case--and this whole includes the conditions outside the respective job, outside the respective plant, outside the respective personal situation. This whole is eliminated by the translation, and it is this operation which makes the cure possible. (1964, pp. 109-110)

Marcuse goes on:

> . . . In this context, functionalization has a truly therapeutic effect. Once the personal discontent is isolated from the general unhappiness, once the universal concepts which militate against functionalization are dissolved into particular referents, the case becomes a treatable and tractable incident. To be sure, the case remains incident of a universal--no mode of thought can dispense with universals--but of a genus very different from that meant in the untranslated statement. The worker B, once his medical bills have been taken care of, will recognize that, generally speaking, wages are not too low, and that they were a hardship only in his individual situation (which may be similar to other individual situations). His case has been subsumed under another genus--that of personal hardship cases. He is no longer a "worker" or "employee" (member of a class), but the worker or employee B in the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company.

In conclusion, the threat to the values referred to in Question 1 manifests itself in terms of a prevailing sense of personal alienation and estrangement. The translation of this sense of personal alienation and estrangement into the related and appropriate public and social issues is often short-circuited so that the problem and solution to alienation remains defined in personal terms (i.e., personal troubles). This occurs because the single situation or particular case rather than the social system in which it is grounded, often becomes the object of treatment. The end result is that the personal trouble becomes isolated

and treated apart from the pathology of the social system; the latter is thus insulated from critical study.

4. Are people generally aware and concerned about the threat to these values, or do they define the personal troubles and public issues they experience in terms of other values?

Laing and Marcuse both tell us that people are not generally aware and concerned about the threat to the values described in Question 1. Laing states:

> Human beings seem to have an almost unlimited capacity to deceive themselves, and to deceive themselves into taking their own lies for truth. By such mystification, we achieve and sustain our adjustment, adaptation, socialization. But the result of such adjustment to our society is that, having been tricked and having tricked ourselves out of our minds, that is to say, out of our own personal worlds of experience, out of that unique meaning with which potentially we may endow the external world, simultaneously we have been conned into the illusion that we are separate "skin-encapsuled egos." Having at one and the same time lost our selves and developed the illusion that we are autonomous egos, we are expected to comply by inner consent with external constraints, to an almost unbelievable extent. (1967, pp. 72-73)

The process through which we maintain a false consciousness and sustain our adjustment to our current social system Laing calls "mystification," the prime function of which is to maintain the status quo. Laing describes how mystification works:

> To mystify, in the active sense, is to befuddle, cloud, obscure, mask whatever is going on, whether this be experience, action, in process, or whatever is "the issue." It induces confusion in the sense that there is failure to see what is "really" being experienced, or being done, or going on, and failure to distinguish or discriminate the actual issues. This entails the substitution of false for true constructions of what is being experienced, being done (praxis), or going on (process), and the substitution of false issues for the actual issues. (1965, p. 344)

Laing continues:

> If we detect mystification, we are alerted to the presence of a conflict of some kind that is being evaded. The mystified person, in so far as he has been mystified, is unable to see the authentic conflict, but may or may not experience intra- or interpersonal conflict of an inauthentic kind. He may experience false peace, false calm, or inauthentic conflict and confusion over false issues. (1965, p. 345)

Laing relates how mystification works on a social level:

> Marx used the concept of mystification to mean a plausible misrepresentation of what is going on (process) or what is being done (praxis) in the service of the interests of one socioeconomic class (the exploiters) over or against another class (the exploited). By representing forms of exploitation as forms of benevolence, the exploiters bemuse the exploited into feeling at one with their exploiters, or into feeling gratitude for what (unrealized by them) in their exploitation, and, not least, into feeling bad or mad even to think of rebellion. (1965, p. 343)

The values that the majority of people define their personal troubles and social issues over are the normative standards and needs propagated by advanced industrial society.

Marcuse states:

> If the worker and his boss enjoy the same television program and visit the same resort places, if the typist is as attractively made up as the daughter of her employer, if the Negro owns a Cadillac, if they all read the same newspaper, then this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of classes, but the extent to which the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment are shared by the underlying population. (1967, p. 8)

Marcuse continues:

> We are again confronted with one of the most vexing aspects of advanced industrial civilization: the rational character of its irrationality. Its productivity and efficiency, its capacity to increase and spread comforts, to turn waste into need, and destruction into construction, the extent to which this civilization transforms the object world into an extension of man's mind and body makes the very notion of alienation questionable. The people recognize themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment. The very mechanism which ties the individual to his society has changed, and social control is anchored in the new needs which it has produced. (1964, p. 9)

In conclusion, people are generally unaware of the threat to the values described in Question 1. The values that the majority of people define their personal troubles and public issues over are the normative standards and needs propagated by advanced industrial society. Hence, when the social context is studied, social issues often become defined in terms of quantitative adjustments rather than qualitative changes, since the criteria for judging the given system are often the norms of that system. This makes for a "locked" analysis since the range of judgments is limited within the norms of that system and exclude critical concepts that challenge their validity.

The methodology developed in this chapter can now be summarized. The framework for this methodology will revolve around the following five questions extracted from Mills' (1959) The Sociological Imagination.

1. What values are really threatened in our present society?
2. By whom or by what are these values threatened?
3. What is the connection between the threat to these values and their manifestation in terms of personal troubles and public issues?
4. Are people generally aware and concerned about the threat to these values, or do they define the personal troubles and public issues they experience in terms of other values?
5. What are the levers for change?

The following answers to these questions as summarized from the writings of Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964) will provide the substantive base for the methodology.

These questions and answers will then be used in the next two chapters as a frame of reference to analyze selected works in the field of laboratory training.

Question 1: What values are really threatened in our present society?

A. Full possibilities of maximizing our human potential;

B. Authentic cultural pluralism and its accompanying self-determination and freedom of choice;

C. Qualitative social change which would permit the above values to be actualized on a public scale and would establish essentially different institutions, a new direction for the productive process, and new modes of human existence.

Question 2: By whom or by what are these values threatened?

A. By the domination of a self-perpetuating, survival-scarcity oriented technology, with its concomitant means of production and distribution.

B. By collaborating socialization mechanisms (e.g. family, school system, etc.) where competitive, survival-oriented skills, attitudes, and roles are taught, rewarded, and eventually internalized in people.

C. By alienated and brutalized people who through action, attitude, and social role perpetuate repressive needs, repressive consciousness, and repressive institutions.

Question 3: What is the connection between the threat to these values and their manifestation in terms of personal troubles and public issues?

The threat to these values referred to in Question 1 manifests itself in terms of a prevailing sense of personal alienation and estrangement. The translation of this sense of personal alienation into the related and appropriate public and social issues is often short-circuited so that the problem and solution to alienation remains defined in personal terms (i.e., personal troubles). This occurs because the single situation or particular case, rather than the social system in which it is grounded, often becomes the object of treatment. The end result is that the personal trouble becomes isolated and treated apart from the pathology of the social system; the latter is thus insulated from critical study.

Question 4: Are people generally aware and concerned about the threat to these values or do they define the personal troubles and public issues they experience in terms of other values?

People are generally unaware of the threat to the values described in Question 1. The values that the majority of people define their personal troubles and public issues over are the normative standards and needs propagated by advanced industrial society. Hence, when the social context is studied, social issues often become defined in terms of quantitative adjustments rather than qualitative changes, since the criteria for judging the given system are often the norms of that system. This makes for a "locked" analysis since the range of judgments is limited within the norms of that system and excludes critical concepts that challenge their validity.

Question 5: What are the levers for change?

The levers for change will be broken down and summarized in two areas as they relate to the values that Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964) see as threatened in our society.

A. Levers to increase peoples' ability to maximize their human potential:

1. There is a need for a critical frame of reference which judges human behavior in terms of human potential rather than our currently operative normative standards (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 214-215).

2. In our efforts to develop our human potential, it is not enough to analyze the immediate experiential concreteness of a situation and the behaviors to be maximized within it. We must also study the factors which make up the larger social context and the behavior of people in it and how the desired changes can be supported and sustained (Laing, 1967, p. 48).

3. There is a need to make a personal value judgment as to how alienated and estranged we are from our own potential, and the degree to which others suffer from this alienation. We must assess our willingness to change this condition (Laing, 1967, Introduction).

4. In order to achieve the above, there must be a demystification of experience through the following: (a) awareness of authentic personal and social sources of oppression and conflict (Laing, 1965, pp. 343-345); (b) the

validation of experiences through human contact and communal sharing (Laing, 1967, pp. 56, 77).

B. Levers leading to a greater freedom of mind, spirit, choice, and qualitative social change:

1. We must refuse to accept the prevailing ideology of society as an inherent reality. Rather, we must develop a transcending analysis and consciousness which compares current practices of society with other possible alternatives and evaluates them in terms of their potential to contribute to optimal human development (Marcuse, 1964, Introduction).

2. We must intensify our consciousness of social indoctrination and oppression, sharpen our awareness of how we are preconditioned to want to (a) produce, (b) consume, (c) compete, (d) possess, etc. in accordance with the current technological and economic needs of our social system (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 4-11).

3. We must assess the extent of vulnerability to cooptation of oppositional and transcending alternatives through their wholesale incorporation into the established order. The ideal becomes prostituted through the depletion of its oppositional and substantive values while its form (i.e., technology) is reproduced and displayed on a massive scale. In this way the rationality of a critical protest against the established order is absorbed, and the potentially transcending alternative ends up supporting the existing social order (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 57-61).

4. In order to gain a critical perspective on our society, we must adopt a sense of and detachment from its current values and operation. Empathy and identification must be replaced by estrangement and dissociation. Through this process the current social order can then be critically judged as one possible historical practice among many (Marcuse, 1964, p. 67).
5. We need to avoid the tendency to identify the truth value of an experiential reality with the possibility of it constituting a social reality (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 170-180).
6. In analyzing problems critically for their social relevance, we need to look at their generalizing potential. In its generalizability, a particular problem can become a manifestation of a large social system issue. The more a particular problem (e.g., particular situation, case) lends itself to being generalizable, the more correct it is to translate it from the realm of a personal trouble into a public issue. If a problem is truly unique and idiosyncratic, it is correct to formulate it as a personal trouble (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 108-114).
7. We must learn to employ a dialectical approach which helps us see the contradiction and tension existing between "what is" and "what ought to be." This approach assumes that the current social reality is not an inherent-objective reality but one established historical

practice (i.e., established universe of facts, ideas, values) which must be judged against other possible alternative practices (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 141-142).

8. We must analyze the irrationality and contradictions of established society, and determine the alternative tendencies and practices within the society which, if allowed to emerge, could lead to more optimal human development (Marcuse, 1964, p. 227).

Conclusion

In the following two chapters, the questions and answers that constitute the basis of this methodology will be used as a frame of reference to analyze selected works in the field of laboratory training.

In Chapter IV, the methodology developed in this chapter will be applied to an analysis of Kurt Lewin's, "Resolving Social Conflicts" (1948) and Abraham Maslow's, "Eupsychian Management" (1965). These two works were chosen because they appeared to be representative of the social, historical, and philosophical background out of which current laboratory education practices have emerged.

In Chapter V, the methodology will be applied to analyze Donald Klein's (1968) "Community Dynamics and Mental Health" and Chris Argyris' "Intervention Theory and Method" (1970). The selected works of these two laboratory educators were chosen because they exemplify attempts at applying laboratory education principles in work with large social systems.

CHAPTER IV

A REPRESENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LABORATORY TRAINING

Social-Experiential-Critical Analysis As Applied To Selected Writings Of Lewin And Maslow

Question 1: What values are really threatened in our present society?

Lewin answers this question mainly in terms of his concern for the values of democracy, based on tolerance of differences, equality of rights and opportunity, freedom of choice for individuals, and cultural pluralism for groups. He would place emphasis on human values as opposed to superhuman values, such as the state, science, etc., and he would stress education for independence rather than blind obedience.

In order to obtain and sustain a democracy, Lewin sees the need for practical everyday experiences with democracy and continual development and refinement of democratic leadership, fellowship, and democratic values. For Lewin, democracy must be learned anew by each new generation since it is a far harder structure to sustain than an autocracy where the initiative and responsibility rests with the leader (Lewin, 1948, pp. 36, 52, 77, 122).

In contrast, Maslow answers this question in terms of people becoming self-actualizing and maximizing their human potential. Maslow coined the term "Eupsychia" to mean movement towards psychological health (i.e., self-actualization). It is concerned with the actions taken by people to foster such a condition and the mental and social conditions

needed to sustain it. In short, it stands for the ideal but possible heights that human development can reach (1965, Preface).

Maslow delineates the needs that must be met before Eupsychian conditions could prevail. They include satisfaction of basic safety and security needs, belonging needs, love needs, respect needs, and self-esteem needs (1965, p. 15).

In comparing the combined answers of Lewin (1948) and Maslow with Marcuse and Laing (1965, 1967), there seems to be a strong similarity in terms of their valuing cultural pluralism and its accompanying self-determination and freedom of choice, and the need for people to maximize their human potential. The crucial difference lies in their analysis of the capacity and willingness of American society to permit the above values to be actualized on a public scale. Both Lewin and Maslow, though acknowledging the need for quantitative adjustments in our system, see the conditions of American society as basically favoring the development of the values they are advocating. There is no inherent conflict for Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965) as there is for Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964) between the values they are espousing and the way American society is organized.

Lewin states:

> . . . the American happens to live in a country where the efficiency of the process of group decisions is relatively highly developed, at least in small groups, and where democratic leadership is thoroughly accepted as a cultural pattern and taught in practice to children in school. (1948, p. 37)

Lewin had a strong faith in the American brand of democracy and felt that Americans so deeply understood the principles of democracy that they would be the natural ones to teach the practical application of democracy to Germany after World War II.

Lewin states:

> If one conceives the task of democratizing realistically as a process which has to reach deep into family action and everyday group life it seems to be somewhat hopeless to attempt such a change mainly through schools. Hundreds of thousands of American teachers would have to be sent over. These Americans, even hyphenated Americans and certainly refugees, are likely to create nothing but resentment in such a position.
>
> . . . It seems feasible and natural to build up group work around the feeding of Europe after this war in such a way that the cooperative work for reconstruction would offer a real experience in democratic group life. It would be possible to reach a large number and a variety of age levels in this and other works of reconstruction. (1948, p. 41)

It is hard to fault Lewin's faith in American democracy when one realizes that he was a German Jew who was exposed to the horrors and brutality of the Nazi era in Germany. His frame of reference was such that America was truly a positive alternative to Germany.

Lewin's faith and identification with American society led him to believe that a natural extension of work for an action-oriented social scientist was to help American industry become more productive and efficient. In order to achieve this goal, Lewin recognized the importance of attending to the informal grouping of people, the "human relations factor" which often established unofficial work norms that management often ignored.

In discussing the successful work in industry of colleague Alex Borelas, Lewin describes the factors human relations workers must deal with:

> It seems that the basic principles which guided the action of the psychologist might be summed up as follows: The realistic demands of production have to be satisfied in a way which conforms with the nature of group dynamics.
>
> To bring about a permanent solution it does not suffice to create amicable relations. The conflict described arose out of an aspect

> of production where overlapping authorities existed in a cognitively unclear situation. The procedure is guided to an equal degree by the consideration of production and the problem of social relations.
>
> As to details, one might mention the following points. The factory work can be seen as a process in which the speed is determined by certain driving and restraining forces. The production process runs through certain "channels" as determined by the physical and social settings, particularly by certain "rules" and by the authorities in power (management). To increase production one can try to increase the driving forces by higher incentives or pressure, or try to weaken these forces that keep production down. The procedure described here follows the latter possibility. It tries to eliminate certain conflicts within the group and certain psychological forces acting on a key individual (the mechanical) which deter his efforts. (Lewin, 1948, p. 138)

Hence, Lewin accepted the prevailing American definition of progress in terms of expanding production and consumption. His prime concern was the development of "means" for humanizing the technology so that it might better coincide with the above definition of progress. Lewin did not seem to question the direction and end products of technology. He did not see a strong need for the establishment of different institutions or new directions for the productive process. This was probably due to his belief that a basic harmony of interest exists between the good society (American democracy) and the needs of its citizens.

Lewin's analysis contrasts with Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964) who saw a basic conflict of interests existing between American society and its citizens. For Laing and Marcuse the vested interests of our society are organized around the principles of pseudo-scarcity and competition which creates a destructive form of the struggle for existence within and between individuals. The end result of this contrast of analyses was that Lewin's prime commitment was not to "qualitative social change," as defined by Laing and Marcuse but rather to the improvements

and adjustments that would make a basically good American society an even better one.

Maslow too, tends to identify with American society and sees a basic harmony of interests between the way American society is organized and the psychological needs of people. He sees American society as fostering the conditions necessary for Eupsychian principles to work.

Maslow states:

> Another thing that has to be said very clearly and made far more conscious than it now is in the management literature is that Drucker and the other theorists are assuming good conditions and good luck, good fortune. It is perfectly true that these assumptions are valid in the United States at this time. It is just as true that they are probably not valid or at least not as valid in other countries and would not be valid in the United States if there were some kind of atomic catastrophe, for instance. (1965, p. 36)

> Certainly I would not assume it under such circumstances, even though I do assume all of these things under present circumstances. The higher life and the higher kind of human being which Drucker has been assuming certainly does exist now. Historically, the American citizen is a relatively high type--especially American women who are far more advanced than the women of most of the rest of the world. But this higher life rests upon the prior gratification of the basic needs, e.g., safety needs which are now satisfied, belongingness needs which are now satisfied and so on. But supposing that these basic need gratifications were removed or threatened or put into short supply. Then the high superstructure of health psychology (eupsychology) would collapse. (1965, p. 37)

From Maslow's analysis, one sees no mention of how the technological base of our society is organized around perpetuating a false sense of deprivation of basic needs thereby fostering conditions which tend to fixate people at lower levels of need gratification. By preconditioning people to want to produce, and consume, and by having planned obsolescence as a basic feature of our economy, conditions are created which help to perpetuate a pseudo-scarcity survival orientation which works against the attainment of higher levels of human development required

for Maslow's Eupsychian management principles to prosper.

Although Maslow's analysis does not elucidate the threat and conflict existing between the way the technological base of American society is organized and the attainment of human potential values, he does point to a vision of qualitative change in the concept of synergy. Maslow states:

> Ruth Benedict has defined synergy as the social-institutional arrangements which fuse selfishness and unselfishness, by transcending their oppositeness and polarity so that the dichotomy between selfishness and altruism is resolved and transcended and formed into a new higher unity: This is to be done by institutional arrangements so that when I pursue my selfish gratifications I automatically help others, and when I try to be altruistic, I automatically reward and gratify myself. (1965, p. 103)

For Maslow, synergy was the social-institutional equivalent of psychological health (i.e., self-actualization) within the individual and was the ultimate goal of a healthy society (1965, p. 88).

Question 2: By whom or what are these values threatened?

Lewin (1948) tells us that democracy and freedom are related to and interwoven with every other aspect of the culture e.g., child rearing practices, how schools are run, how the process of education is conducted. Hence, democracy is fostered or threatened by experiences that people have daily in their life in groups. Democracy requires continual cultivation and renewal in terms of training people to be democratic leaders and followers; development of democratic structures and processes where voluntary and responsible participation is rewarded and democratic values internalized. Where these conditions do not prevail in the general cultural settings in which individuals and groups live, democracy falters. Democracy is also threatened by conditions in the general

culture which support intolerance, an emphasis on superhuman (e.g., state, science) as opposed to human values, and education which trains people to be obedient rather than independent.

Maslow delineates the following conditions as threatening the emergence of Eupsychian management: (1) scarcity of goods; (2) cessation of or threats to basic need gratification; (3) antisynergic laws and institutions; (4) bad communications; (5) dishonesty and the vulgarization of the truth (1965, p. 42).

Maslow stresses how conditions of scarcity create survival oriented behavior which works against the development of synergic systems.

> Now another point that I want to deal with at length is the fact that synergy, mutual interdependence, mutual advantage, the "what's-good-for-me-is-good-for-you" kind of philosophy, is all very true in the long run under good conditions. It is definitely not true in the short run, in emergencies, under bad conditions, especially under conditions of scarcity. When there is a need for ten lamb chops and only one lamb chop exists, then in fact my interest is antagonistic to your interests. Whoever gets the lamb chop is hurting the other people. What is good for me is bad for you under such circumstances. We must be very aware of this. . . (1965, pp. 115-116)

Another threat to self-actualization and the creation of synergic systems is the tendency towards an "atomistic" conceptualization of the world, or the tendency to perceive things as existing exclusively, with no mutuality, no interrelationship, no higher unity (1965, pp. 108, 112).

For Maslow, the overriding issue as to whether we will have self-actualizing individuals and synergic institutions is the health of the society in which we live.

> More should be said on the relation between the enterprise and the society, especially if we take into account the ways to keep the organization healthy over a period of a hundred years. It then becomes most obvious about the mutual ties between the enterprise and the society--for one thing the healthy organization will need a steady supply of fairly well-matured and well-educated personalities (it cannot use delinquents, criminals, cynical kids, spoiled and indulged

> kids, hostile people, warmongers, destroyers, vandals, etc., but exactly these people are the products of a poor society). This is very much like saying that a poor society cannot support healthy enterprises, in the long run at least. . .
>
> It is also true that the healthy enterprise cannot function at all well under conditions of riots and civil war, of epidemics, of sabotage and murder, of class warfare, or caste warfare. The culture itself has to be healthy for this reason as well. (Maslow, 1965, p. 58)

As mentioned previously, Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965) do not stress, as Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964) do, how the values discussed in Question 1 are threatened by the maintenance of a self-perpetuating survival-scarcity oriented technology. Nor do Lewin and Maslow discuss how socialization mechanisms such as the family and school system collaborate in fostering a survival-scarcity oriented life approach. Nor is there a discussion of the logic and functionality (though not necessarily health) of people acting in highly competitive, closed, and distrustful ways, given the accumulative effects of the values of our current technology and primary socialization mechanisms operating on people.

Question 3: What is the connection between the threat to these values and their manifestation in terms of personal troubles and public issues?

Lewin (1948) tells us that when the values of democracy and freedom of choice are threatened they manifest themselves in terms of the following personal troubles: (1) increased tension; (2) intolerance; (3) hostile domination; (4) hostile criticism; (5) personalized-self-centered attitudes; (6) submissiveness and blind obedience to authority; (7) restlessness; (8) personal aggression.

Lewin sees the following public issues manifesting themselves as a result of the threat to the values of democracy and freedom of choice: (1) economic and social discrimination; (2) barriers of caste and group prejudice; (3) minority self-hatred; (4) fascism; (5) war versus peace; (6) emphasis on superhuman values versus human values.

One further point should be made in terms of Lewin's (1948) answer to Question 3: He did not really deal with "alienation" and "estrangement" as a manifestation of the problem of contemporary life. Lewin (1948) seemed to be concerned with the problems of humanizing a developing industrial society (e.g., increasing productivity, economic and social barriers against sharing the wealth of the nation).

Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964) seem more concerned about the problems of an advanced or post-industrial era where the central issues move away from the questions of struggle and survival to the "quality of life." Where problems become defined less in terms of "creating the pie" and sharing it (i.e., my piece of the pie) and more in terms of "how does the pie taste?" Hence, the concern with the "problem of alienation" might be considered a public luxury of a post-industrial society, in contrast to less developed societies, where people do not have the time and energy to devote to the higher issues of life.

Maslow (1965) tells us that "if" social conditions are unfavorable for the meeting of higher human needs (Maslow sees condition as favorable in the United States), people will tend to become fixated at lower levels, such as at safety needs. The result would be that people would tend to be perpetually afraid (e.g., fear unemployment, loss of income) and see themselves in a survival contest with others for the

scarce resources available. They would then tend to act in a highly suspicious and competitive way towards each other for they would see their interests as being mutually exclusive rather than compatible with each other.

Maslow elucidates the issues:

> To be more specific, what I am feeling is that these new Theory Y eupsychian management policies are in fact very fine in today's United States, with citizens who are fairly healthy, sophisticated, and autonomous, under cultural circumstances of a particular kind, in a democracy, etc. But suppose there were some kind of atomic catastrophe or great bubonic plague or something of the sort and the circumstances then changed to living under jungle law. What then would be good management policy? Obviously, it would be very different. What we now call good management policy would then be absolutely stupid and ruinous. You can trust people according to Theory Y in a wealthy society in which there is plenty of money, plenty of goods, plenty of good, but obviously you cannot trust people with a key to the pantry when most people are starving, or when there is not enough food to go around. What would I then do under such circumstances? Well, I'm very clear about it in my own mind. If there were one hundred people and there was food for ten, and ninety of these hundred had to die, then I would make mighty goddamned sure that I would not be one of those ninety, and I'm quite sure that my morals and ethics and so on would change very radically to fit the jungle situation rather than the previous situation of wealth in which these principles once had worked well. (1965, pp. 70-71)

Maslow goes on to tell us that as a consequence of this jungle world view authoritarian tendencies and practices would have a greater natural following.

> I showed there that if the jungle world view was in fact correct, then the only realistic thing to be was authoritarian. I was trying to show how it was not crazy, but that it was really all sensible and logical and rational and even necessary if one granted the original premise that life was a jungle and the people in it were jungle animals with mutually exclusive interests. (1965, p. 98)

From Lewin's (1948) and Maslow's (1965) analysis, one sees an ability to make the connection between the threat to the values referred to in Question 1 and their manifestation in terms of personal troubles

and public issues. They do not stress, however, as Laing (1965) and Marcuse (1964) do the dangers of social issues becoming defined purely as personal troubles. This works against social change by making the single situation or particular cause the sole object of critical study and treatment, rather than the social system which often helped cause the problem.

Question 4: Are people generally aware and concerned about the threat to these values or do they define the personal troubles and public issues they experience in terms of other values?

Lewin does not seem to be concerned about a strong threat within the United States to the values of democracy and freedom of choice. Though acknowledging problems in the United States such as prejudice against minority groups (e.g., Negroes, Jews, etc.), economic and social discrimination, Lewin had basic faith in America to eventually resolve these issues. Since Lewin's other frame of reference was Nazi Germany, he tended to rate the United States high in these values.

Lewin states:

> Closely related to the respect for the rights of the child is the tendency of American education to help the child in every way to become practically independent as soon as possible. Much care is taken to develop means and techniques which permit the child to dress himself, to feed and serve himself, and to perform other parts of the daily routine independently. Similar tendencies are common to progressive education in all countries, but the actual freedom of choice and the actual degree of independence intended by the adult, and reached by the child, seem to be considerably higher in the United States than in a comparable German milieu. (1948, pp. 8-9)

Lewin elaborates elsewhere:

> Such cases are small yet significant criteria for the greater "respect" which the American has for the other individual. They show that the aversion against interfering with children, which we have

> mentioned in the educational fields, is but an expression of a different basic relation between the individuals in the United States and Germany. The difference is obviously closely related to the American's ideal of democracy, to the idea that fundamentally every person has the same right, regardless of whether he is rich or poor, the President, or an average citizen. The same lack of submissiveness which appears in the relation between child and adult is characteristic of the behavior of the American employee toward his employer, or of the student toward his professor. (1948, pp. 14-15)

Since Lewin seemed to identify positively with American society, he showed a tendency to define personal troubles and public issues in terms of the normative standards and needs of American society. For example, as previously discussed, Lewin bought into the supposed need of American industry for higher productivity, and dealt with this by attending to the human relations factor within the industry. He correctly reasoned that when this factor was left unnoticed by management, it could often have detrimental effects on productivity.

In analyzing Maslow's response to Question 4, one sees that although he believes that the conditions existing in America are basically favorable to synergic institutional arrangements, he has qualms about the short-sightedness of the goals and concerns that many management theorists and practitioners operate from. Maslow states:

> It is really fantastic that one book after another will make a pious statement about this new development and about organizational theory and management theory all resting on a new knowledge and a new conception of human nature and especially of motivation, and then proceed to say nothing whatsoever about values and purposes. . .
>
> I've seen very few of these managers or writers on organizational theory who have the courage to think in far terms, in broad-range terms, in utopian terms, in value terms. Generally, they feel they are being hard-headed if they use as the criteria of management success or of healthy organization the criteria of smaller labor turnover or less absenteeism or better morale or more profit or the like. But in so doing, they neglect the whole eupsychian growth and self-actualization and personal development side of the enlightened enterprise. (1965, pp. 39-40)

Question 5: What are the levers for change?

Lewin describes the following levers to be used for the purpose of democratizing:

1. He argues that trained democratic leadership is needed in key power positions. For Lewin, the crucial determinant of democratic group atmosphere lies in democratic leadership. Lewin does not assume that people, if left alone, will follow democratic practices; it needs to be learned. Nor does Lewin assume that if subleaders in organizations (e.g., foremen) practice democratic principles, but the powers above them (e.g., management) do not, will these subleaders be able to sustain the effectiveness of their democratic practice. (Lewin, 1948, pp. 38-40)
2. Since the democratic process is a complex one to learn not only must democratic leaders be trained in their roles, but the followers must be trained in the roles of democratic membership. Democratic membership requires voluntary participation of an active, informed, and responsible nature. This is important because the ultimate goal of a democratic leader is to become inevitably less of a leader to be replaced by indigenous leadership developing within the group.
3. To change attitudes and behavior, Lewin stresses the utility of small groups. The group to which the individual belongs and develops a positive identification, which serves as a frame of reference and reward system for his perceptions, feelings, and actions.

4. Action research: Lewin believes that the worth of a theory is to be tested in action. Research should have an active component and people should be prepared to reevaluate and study continually the results of their action as new data becomes available. In group work, this was often done by continually observing and feeding back the results of their observation for verification. It means that group members had to develop participant-observer skills; to remain active while at the same time being objective enough to examine data with a minimum of bias and distortion.

5. Lewin also stresses the need to understand and deal with the "general cultural atmosphere" if one wishes to maintain and sustain the changes produced within any subsystem of the culture. The changes produced within the subsystem must be made congruent with some basic aspects of the general culture in which these individuals or group live.

Lewin states:

> Once a given level is established, certain self-regulatory processes come into function which tend to keep group life on that level. One speaks of "work habits," "established customs," "the accepted way of doing things." Special occasions may bring about a momentary rise of production, a festival may create for a day or two a different social atmosphere between management and workers, but quickly the effect of the "shot in the arm" will fade out and the basic constellation of forces will re-establish the old forms of everyday living. (1948, p. 46)

Lewin summarizes the issue:

> A cultural change in regard to a specific item will have to be able to stand up against the weight of the thousand and one items of the rest of the culture which tends to turn the conduct back to its old pattern. As someone has put it, "Culture are pretty water-tight."
>
> We may conclude: To be stable, a cultural change has to penetrate more or less into all aspects of a nation's life. The change must, in short, be a change in the "cultural atmosphere," not merely a change of single items. (1948, p. 48)

Hence, for Lewin, lasting changes involved cultural changes which lead him to view re-education as basically a task of acculturation. The re-educative process must affect the individual in the following three realms: (1) cognitive structure; (2) values; (3) actions. These changes, to be effective, cannot occur in a piecemeal fashion independently of each other, but must be going on simultaneously within the framework of the individual's total life situation.

The basic medium for these changes is the creation of a new "in-group" and the "feeling of belongingness" that it provides. Within this group, a democratic atmosphere is to be created, with the power constellations in the group supporting this atmosphere, and the methods of leadership employed being consistent with it.

Maslow discusses the following levers for change:

1. A frame of reference based on "feasible" utopian values. Human potential values that he believes have a real potential to be actualized in our society. The basic principles from which Maslow operates are that people can live at various levels in the motivation hierarchy--from the extreme of a survival jungle-like existence to life in an eupsychian society where all basic needs are met and life is devoted towards achieving higher levels of human development. Maslow uses these higher-need levels as a reference point to be strived for. This is the level of esteem and self-esteem where concern is centered around issues of dignity, autonomy, self-respect, feelings of worth, etc.
2. Maslow argues for the establishment of a moral and ethical accounting system where tax credits are given to institutions that

help improve society and tax penalties are assessed against those whose work are at odds with social betterment. This is based on the assumption that American institutions have an obligation and responsibility to improve the community and environment of which they are a part. This would force institutions to think beyond their short-run interests (e.g., profit, productivity, etc.) and be concerned with the long range health of their system. They would be interested in how well their institutions contribute to the development of self-actualized people, both in terms of their employees and the clients they service. Self-actualization in this sense would extend to people becoming better citizens, better husbands and wives, and in general, more fully human.

3. His model requires the modification of economic theory and practice in line with Eupsychian Principles:
   A. This would entail society guaranteeing or making readily and cheaply available the basic needs to eat, sleep, and have shelter. This would permit people to be freed to concentrate on attaining higher levels of human development.
   B. A fair, free, and open market where the best product would be most likely chosen.
   C. Unlimited production at low prices rather than limited production with high profit.
4. Maslow supports the utilization of a synergic frame of reference. Synergy is the concept he uses to stand for the institutional equivalent of psychological health within individuals. It thus

provides a powerful instrument for classifying the institutions. It is based on a sense of partnership existing between the individual and institution, and the institution and society, so that interests and goals merge instead of remaining separate, opposed, or mutually exclusive. It is a resolution of the dichotomy between selfishness and unselfishness, private interests and public interests in terms of a higher unity and interrelatedness. It is achieved by institutional arrangements so that when an individual is pursuing his own goals, he is automatically helping others, and when he is being altruistic, he is automatically rewarded.

5. In Maslow's judgment, treating people well spoils them for being treated badly. Giving people good conditions spoils them for bad conditions.

6. He advocates a holistic approach to social improvement. Systems change as a whole or unit, with parts of system being interrelated to each other. Real social change involves simultaneous changes in all parts, e.g., individuals, groups, institutions, technology, etc. Maslow believes changes in industrial institutions have widest repercussions, but this would still require corresponding changes in other institutions in order to sustain industrial changes. The implications of all this are that eupsychian management principles cannot spread unless society is ready for them. This would involve our technology being ready for them, management and workers being ready for them, politicians being ready for them, schools being ready for them, etc. In terms of leadership, it means giving up the notion of

the "Messiah" or great leader who can take care of everything, and instead accepting significant social change as an arduous, slow, and complex process.

In comparing the levers for change described by Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965) with Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964), one sees that there is a great deal of overlap. At times, the terms are different but the concepts are often the same.

The following are a list of levers for change emphasized by Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964), but not by Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965).

1. A demystification of experience through an awareness of authentic personal and social sources of oppression and conflict.
2. Consciousness of social indoctrination and oppression and awareness of how we are preconditioned to want to: (1) produce; (2) consume; (3) compete; (4) possess, etc. in keeping with current technological and economic needs of our social system.
3. Recognition of the vulnerability to cooptation of oppositional and transcending alternatives through their wholesale encorporation into the established order. The ideal becomes prostituted through the depletion of its oppositional and substantive values while its form (i.e., technology) is reproduced and displayed on a massive scale. In this way, the rationality of its protest against the established order is absorbed and the potentially transcending alternative ends up supporting the existing social order.
4. A sense of distance and detachment from society's current values and operation. Empathy and identification must be replaced by

estrangement and dissociation. Through this process, the current social order can then be critically judged as one possible historical practice among many.

5. The generalizing potential of human problems. In its generalizability, a particular problem can become a manifestation of a larger social system issue. The more a particular problem lends itself to being generalizable, the more correct it is to translate it from the realm of a personal trouble into a public issue. If a problem is truly unique and idiosynaratic, it is correct to formulate it as a personal trouble.

In analyzing the levers for change omitted by Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965), certain patterns emerge. Omissions of levers number 1 and number 5 indicates a lack of criticalness by Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965) in differentiating between legitimate personal and social sources of oppression and conflict. From this, there follows a lack of adequate guidelines for distinguishing personal troubles from social issues. It is important to make this distinction between personal troubles and social issues because this helps determine whether the appropriate level of intervention is at a small (e.g., individual, work group, family, etc.) or large system (e.g., institution, community, culture) level. Hence, this initial lack of clarity about "how to define" the problem eventually results in confusion about "how to resolve" it.

Omission of levers numbers 2, 3, and 4 shows a limited understanding by Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965) of large social and technological sources of oppression and conflict. Along with this, there exists a "vulnerability" of the human relations movement to cooptation since

there is no clear statement warning about the dangers of protest absorption by society against threatening alternatives. In analyzing level number 4, one can understand (at least in part) why Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965) tended not to develop a critical perspective on American society. Both of these men seemed to identify positively with the American culture and hence did not develop the necessary sense of distance and detachment needed for an encompassing social critique.

CHAPTER V

A REPRESENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LABORATORY TRAINING PRACTICES AS APPLIED TO LARGE SOCIAL SYSTEM

Social-Experiential-Critical Analysis as Applied to Selected Writings of Argyris and Klein

Question 1: What values are really threatened in our present society?

Klein (1968) answers this question in terms of his concern for the mental health of the community. He defines community as:

> The community, as I now see it, may be defined as patterned interactions within a domain of individuals seeking to achieve security and physical safety, to desire support at times of stress, and to gain selfhood and significance throughout the life cycle. The definitions rest on interactions of individuals rather than on the social organizations whose nature and functions are a manifestation of those interactions. The term domain is used to refer both to a physical place that can be geographically located and to a social-psychological place (such as a community of interest) that is phenomenologically real to those who inhabit it. The view of community on which this book is based is not that community is man's habitat. Rather, community is man in habitat, for the habitat is not meaningful without its inhabitants. (Klein, 1965, p. 11)

The issue of mental health for Klein centers around the quality of the "processes" through which the community deals with its problems and makes decisions that affect the individual inhabitant's well-being. Klein states:

> I believe that the goal of a mentally healthy society--leaving aside whatever this rhetoric may mean to you, me, or any other set of visionaries--is not the kind of final outcome that can be attained by agencies and programs. Rather it is the kind of objective that is achieved or lost by the very nature of the processes by which such agencies and programs are developed. It is the quality of those processes with which I hope you are or will become most concerned. For it is how the community goes about meeting problems and making

> decisions that affects its citizen's social and emotional well-being at least as much as, if not more than, the nature of the solutions or decisions. (1964, p. viii, Preface)

What is significant in Klein's (1968) definition of mental health is that health is basically not conceived of in intra-psychic terms but rather in terms of the "community" as an entity that causes hazards in living and also provides the potential means for positively coping with these hazards. What is also significant is that Klein is not primarily interested in the specific solutions, outcomes, and decisions reached by a community in dealing with its problems, but by the "means" or "processes" of interaction it uses.

Klein stresses a "collaborative approach" toward community problem-solving which is a joint venture involving all significant parties affected by the problem and makes provisions for sharing of responsibilities and creates opportunities for each participant to mutually influence the other. He sees the collaborative approach as linked with the promotion of mental health and contrasts this with the "authoritative approach" with its emphasis on expert-subordinate relationships which he feels has a detrimental effect on mental health. Klein states:

> In the long run, however, a reliance on the authority from the top can have serious consequences for community life. The basis for this belief is in the definition of community advanced at the onset; that it is an interactive domain whose inhabitants are concerned with security and safety, significance, and finding the solutions to the many problems of living. An individual's life today can be affected overnight in massive ways by decisions to re-make the physical characteristics and institutions of his environment. When these are brought about without involvement either of himself or of those whom he trusts, the community (in the eyes of the citizen) becomes less secure and safe, less concerned with his significance, and more fraught with uncertainties that are added to all the other problems of life. There are many instances of community conflict and disruption of needed programs to show that the alienation of the individual weakens the community. (1968, p. 141)

Klein is committed to fostering the collaborative processes within the community, for he sees them as the natural means leading toward more integrative patterns of community life. Integrative patterns refer to the ways in which individuals relate to each other and to the community as well as the ways community resources are coordinated for the common good. Klein states:

> High integration is reflected by a shared sense that there is a positively valued common destiny which binds people together. Opportunities for participation in community affairs are felt to exist for all levels and segments of the population. Residents know that it is possible for groups to put aside differences in order to cope with overriding problems. There is a sense of self-worth that is reflected in the belief that outsiders view the community and its inhabitants positively. (1968, p. 164)

Klein also sees collaborative processes and high integration as having the positive effect of promoting conditions favorable for freedom of choice (which Klein values) and of providing opportunities for people to influence and actively cope with their environment. The overall goal Klein sees for the mental health worker is community improvement based on a deep respect for the processes that lead to community integrity. Klein states:

> Respect for community integrity goes beyond the needed understanding of the roles, functions, programs, goals, and values within each of the key agencies and institutions of the community. It also embraces a concern for the quality of the basic processes which are fundamental to the community's welfare by which I mean such things as the manner in which policy is shaped and decisions made, interactions between different groups are facilitated, communication of information and values is fostered, and leadership encouraged to develop and deal with the myriad problems of community life. (1968, p. 203)

Argyris (1970) answers Question 1 mainly in terms of the threat to the capacity of our institutions to be healthy and self-renewing. Argyris states:

> One of the most urgently needed intellectual crash programs is that of developing new designs of technology, administrative controls, and leadership styles that will lead to organizations capable of being productive and self-renewing, of being effective, and of encouraging self-actualization among the participants. Unless research is conducted immediately and unless workable models become available, we stand a good chance of being the society who could organize to send men to the moon but could not organize so that man's highest human aspirations could be fulfilled. (1970, p. 4)

Hence, from the above quotation, it is quite apparent why Argyris makes the following commitment to creating conditions in institutions favorable to system competence and effectiveness. Argyris maintains:

> The core activities of any system are: (1) to achieve its objectives; (2) to maintain its internal environment; and (3) to adapt to, and maintain control over the relevant external environment. How well the system accomplishes these core activities in any given situation indicates its effectiveness.
>
> A key issue for an interventionist is to know how to help the client system, through the intervention system, increase its competence and effectiveness as it strives to accomplish its three core activities. (1970, p. 36)

Argyris provides the answer to the issue he raises with the following summary:

> A system behaves competently to the extent that it solves problems, makes decisions, and implements decisions effectively. Six criteria of system competence are: (1) awareness of relevant information; (2) understanding by the relevant parts; (3) manipulability; (4) realistic cost; (5) leading to a solution that prevents reoccurence of the problem without deteriorating; and (6) preferably increasing the problem-solving, decision-making, and implementing processes.
>
> In order to achieve the criteria given, it is necessary to develop certain minimal conditions among individuals (self-acceptance, trust of others, confirmation, essentiality, psychological success); about valid information (directly verifiable information--that is, minimally attributive, evaluative, and contradictory); and among groups (shared leadership, identification with group process) as well as achievement of task, experimentation, and risk-taking among intergroup (problem-solving interdependence that minimizes destructive win-lose dynamics) and system norms that support these activities. (1970, pp. 47-48)

In comparing the combined answers of Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968) with Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964), there seems to be an

overlap in terms of their valuing freedom of choice and self-determination and the need for people to maximize their human potential. There is also some agreement in acknowledging that a conflict exists between the values these critics are expousing and the way American society is organized. However, the analysis of the conflict is not as extensive and encompassing for Argyris (1970) and Klein (1970) as it is for Laing and Marcuse. Klein tends to see the conflict as existing between community processes and individual needs, and Argyris tends to focus on the conflict between institutional systems and individual aspriations.

Hence, for these two laboratory practitioners, social change is basically not defined in terms of quantitative "societal" change as Laing and Marcuse tend to do; but rather for Klein in terms of "community improvement" and for Argyris in terms of "organizational system competence and effectiveness."

Question 2: By whom or by what are these values threatened?

Klein tells us that one threat to community improvement is when any one of the following four basic processes becomes dysfunctional:

1. Communication Process: Threats to good communication in the community include:
   a) social distance and stereotyping;
   b) high levels of emotionality such as cherished beliefs are threatened;
   c) fragmentation of information, etc.
2. Decision-Making: Threats to good decision-making in the community include:

a) not involving those significantly effected by the decision (or their representatives) in the decision-making process;

b) not taking into account either the social and emotional factors or technical considerations needed to make an appropriate decision;

c) yes-no approaches which tend to polarize the community and create win-lose situations.

3. Boundary Maintenance: function of regulating the passage of people or ideas between or within regions of the community. Boundary maintenance threatened by:

a) rapid influx of large group of newcomers;

b) urban sprawl, etc.

4. Systemic Linkage: how different systems are related to one another, and how parts of the same system are related. Systemic linkage is threatened when:

a) the interdependence between and within systems is not made explicit;

b) the goals of the different systems or within one system are not compatible.

A second major threat to community improvement is the appearance of disintegrative forces in community life which include the following:

1. Economic or other disasters which affect the basic means of livelihood;
2. Health epidemics;
3. Extensive poverty;
4. Infusion of diverse cultural backgrounds where there is no preparatory value synthesis;

5. Extensive migration of new groups;

6. Rapid social change threatening to many of the traditional patterns of community life.

A third major threat to community improvement are malevolent, self-perpetuating forms of community conflict.

Klein describes the process:

> . . . It is accomplished by a tendency to polarize--to simplify issues into right and wrong, decisions into yes or no, group and individuals into for and against or good and bad. It is difficult, often impossible, to identify with or develop empathy for one's antagonists in a conflict situation. Concomitantly, there is a strengthening of loyalties and ties within each of the warring factions. Between opposing groups, there is distrust. Often each group projects all that is bad onto the opposition. . . . Each stereotypes the other as inherently evil, unprincipled, or at the very least, misguided. . . . As events develop, the issue changes from specific to general disagreements; disagreement becomes direct antagonism; and in the ultimate conflict situation, the community itself becomes split into warring camps. (1968, pp. 152-153)

Argyris answers Question 2 in terms of the conditions that lead to organizational deterioration and entropy. Argyris states:

> To summarize, man has the dubious honor of brilliantly designing human organizations that are destined to follow a course similar to that illustrated in the second law of thermodynamics and slowly deteriorate. He has compounded the felony by evolving change strategies that produce change but at the cost of reinforcing the organizational entropy. What has saved us from disaster is that the processes of organizational entropy have been slow, and change attempts comparatively few. The problem is tragic and urgent because these processes have reached the point of taking an increasing toll of the organizations and their participants at the very time of rising human aspirations. (1970, p. 7)

One specific cause of organizational deterioration and entropy is the ineffective interpersonal skills people learn which tend to generate invalid information.

Argyris states:

> To summarize, man learns early in life to generate information in interpersonal situations that is attributive, evaluative, and communicated

> in inferred categories. According to our model, these conditions increase the probability for creating ineffective interpersonal relationships and invalid information.
>
> Assuming that our model is valid, why would people be taught to behave in a manner hypothesized to be dysfunctional? One hypothesis suggested is that man tends to create in his everyday working life an interpersonal world or milieu in which expressing feelings, experimenting, taking risks, helping others to own up to their ideas and feelings, being open and experimenting, and norms of trust or concern for feelings are rarely observed. In this world (labeled patter A), there is a tendency for individuals to be less aware of the relevant factors operating in critical situations and to be less effective in understanding the behaviors of others, thus to feel a general tendency of ambiguity and lack of clarity about others. . . . The result is a basic tendency for individuals to withhold or distort information about important or difficult issues. (1970, p. 49)

Argyris (1970) tells us that these ineffective behavioral skills are supported and sustained by collaborating organizational structures, administrative controls, and leadership styles used by those in power.

In discussing the workers relationship to the overall organizational structure, Argyris states: "The more rigidity, specialization, tight control, and directive leadership the worker experiences, the more he will tend to create antagonistic adaptive activities." (1970, p. 59)

In discussing current administrative control practices, Argyris (1970) states:

> The underlying assumptions of these managerial controls are that: (1) management (through some staff experts) plans and controls human effort; (2) the control of human effort is manageable by logic, and systematically developed by relatively quantitative techniques; and (3) this latter is achieved by the use of the principles of exception, which means behavior is monitored (on a sample basis) and investigated when it deviates from the plan. (1970, p. 60)

Argyris summarizes the effect of these controls:

> In short, managerial controls tend to create group rivalries, force groups to think of their own and not the other's problems, reward an overall point of view rarely, and place groups in win-lose situations in which they are competing with each other for the scarce resources. (1970, p. 62)

In discussing the prevailing philosophy of management leadership, Argyris states:

> The underlying philosophy of most managements tends to be to appoint leaders whose styles are similar to, and consonant with the impact of the pyramidal structure and the administrative controls. The predominant patterns tend to be what Likert calls "production-centered," McGreger calls "Theory X," and Argyris calls "directive leadership." Leaders are urged to be strong, to drive, sell, pressure, coerce employees to increase their productivity and loyalty. They are charged with getting the facts and controlling the problem-solving, decision-making, and implementation processes. They are also charged with evaluating the performer and the individuals and groups. Research has shown that such leadership results in a decrease of the individual's experience of psychological success and essentiality, and of the probability that he will give valid information to those above or to his peers. Such leadership also tends to increase the frequency of destructive win-lose interdepartmental rivalries. (1970, p. 62)

In summary, Argyris is very explicit in showing us how worker behavioral skills, the organizational structure, managerial controls, and executive leadership styles are all synchronized in such a manner that the conditions leading to system competence tend to be inhibited while opposite conditions are facilitated.

In comparing Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968) with Marcuse (1964) and Laing (1965, 1967), one sees similarities in Argyris' position with that of Marcuse and Laing. The logic and functionality of people acting in highly-competitive, closed, and distrustful ways given the nature of organizational structure and collaborating socialization mechanisms found in the world of work is discussed by Argyris, but not by Klein in any systematic way. However, Argyris basically limits his analysis to institutional dynamics and behavior and never really touches the larger question of how institutional dynamics are related to the overall technological base of American society. Nor do Argyris or Klein discuss other collaborating socialization mechanisms (e.g., family, school system)

and their relationships with the world of work and our society's current technological needs and priorities. Hence, what is crucially lacking in Argyris' (1970) and Klein's (1968) analyses are the dynamics of the systemic linkages that exist between our self-perpetuating, pseudo-scarcity oriented technology and our collaborating socialization mechanisms and the individuals's actions, attitudes, and social roles.

Question 3: What is the connection between the threat to these values and their manifestation in terms of personal troubles and public issues?

Klein (1968) answers this question in relation to the primary thesis of his book; namely, that the community as an entity gives rise both to emotional problems (i.e., personal trouble) in living, and to the potential means for successfully coping with them. When patterns of community living become disintegrative (i.e., public issue), it often manifests itself in symptoms of social pathology. Examples of such symptoms include a relatively high frequency of broken homes, crime and juvenile delinquency, dissolution of friendships and close associations, increase of hostile expressions and behavior. Hence, for Klein, how community needs and processes are handled will have significant implications for psychological well-being.

Argyris sees the threat to organizational competence and effectiveness manifesting itself in terms of personal troubles of the worker: (1) apathy, (2) mistrust, (3) indifference, (4) gold-bricking, (5) absenteeism, (6) alienation, (7) aggression and anger toward bosses through direct and indirect means, (8) the difficulty workers have in developing competence in dealing with feelings and interpersonal

relationships since such behavior is usually not supported by institutional reward systems. Organizational value of rationality and suppression of feelings may eventually lead to a barrenness of creative intellectual ideas as well as values.

Argyris sees the threat to organizational competence and effectiveness manifesting itself in terms of some of the following public issues: (1) the demands of youth for change in institutions so as to live up to their ideals; (2) demands of racial minorities and poor for more responsive institutions; (3) citizens and employee impatience and anger leading to destructive actions on their part and inadequate responses of administrators who often become apathetic themselves.

In comparing Argyris' (1970) and Klein's (1968) answer to Question 3 with Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964), one sees a joint acknowledgement of alienation as a problem but Argyris and Klein do not give this problem the singular importance that Laing and Marcuse do. From Argyris' (1970) and Klein's (1968) analyses, one also sees an ability to make the connection between the threat to the values they refer to in Question 1 and their manifestation in terms of personal troubles and social issues. Also, Argyris and Klein both show clearly the ability to avoid the danger of defining social system issues in terms of personal troubles.

Question 4: Are people generally aware and concerned about the threat to these values, or do they define the personal troubles and public issues they experience in terms of other values?

Klein (1968) tells us that people in the field of mental health are generally unaware of the issues raised by "community" concepts of mental health. They tend to define mental health issues in terms of individual needs, conflicts, and defense mechanisms or as small group problems (e.g., family dynamics) having to do with such phenomena as problems of authority, breakdown in communication, cohesiveness, etc. Such approaches Klein (1968) feels miss the more significant patterned interactions and gestalts that make up community life.

Klein (1968), in the following example raises the issues he believes the field of mental health has not yet fully confronted:

> I believe that the most fundamental questions for the mental health team are those having to do with how the many human needs of the population of this community are being met. The question refers to the entire hierarchy of needs from basic food and shelter to the most lofty ones of self-esteem and creativity. It has taken us too long, for example, to recognize the relative futility of such efforts as providing mental health consultation to educators working with Negro and other disadvantaged children who are convinced that even the education, they are effectively barred from the job market as opposed to doing something about removing the economic barriers themselves. We must learn to ask the kinds of questions that will enable us to recognize the limitations of a program of premarital counseling in an urban setting that fails in the first place to provide sufficient opportunities for mate finding and selection.
>
> It is important to enter the community with the recognition that one of its basic functions is to provide for the many and varied needs of its inhabitants; specialized and scarce mental health talents will be brought to bear most effectively only as we ask ourselves and the community, " Which needs are not being met and why?" (1968, pp. 26-27)

Argyris (1970) tells us that people generally are not aware of the conditions threatening organizational competence and effectiveness. They tend to define the problems they experience in terms of previously developed normative standards. Argyris describes the issue thusly:

> . . . For example, about ten years ago, the top leaders of one of our largest utilities were warned of increasing organizational rigidities unless they reversed the impact of their administrative controls,

> norms against open discussion of conflict, and paternalistic personnel policies. The warning, repeated at several meetings, was ignored largely because the officers could not see or identify the conditions worrying the behavioral scientists. . .
>
> Although a few business leaders have spoken out in an attempt to attack causes, most of them have responded by increasing productivity through new technological advances and passing on costs in the form of higher prices. These reactions can be found in many organizations. (1970, pp. 2-3)

Argyris goes on to tell us that one of the most fundamental conditions often existing within the relationship between the interventionist and client is the underlying discrepancy in the behavioral values of the interventionist and the client, and in the criteria each uses to judge effectiveness. Argyris elaborates:

> The interventionist holds views that tend to be different from the client's about effective relationships. For example, the interventionist tends to emphasize the importance of owning-up to, being open, and experimenting with ideas and feelings within a milieu whose norms include individuality, concern, and trust. The thrust of many client systems, in the name of effectiveness, is to inhibit these variables and emphasize defensive, relatively closed, non-experimenting activities as well as norms that include conformity, mistrust, and antagonism.
>
> The second discrepancy lies in the fact that the members of the client system tend to be unaware of the extent to which they are responsible for these conditions of ineffectiveness. Their tendency is to blame the system. Moreover, although many clients may berate these conditions, they also tend to view them as inevitable and natural, a view not shared by the interventionist.
>
> The third discrepancy is desirable from the first two. The interventionist and the client system tend to hold discrepant views about the nature of strong leadership and effective organizations. They tend to value different human qualities as resources to build upon and make the foundations for change. For example, established management usually defines directive, controlling, task-oriented, rationally focussed as organization. The interventionist believes that such characteristics are most effective under certain conditions and that under a different set of conditions, effective leaders and organizations are able to create conditions for genuine participation and psychological success, where the expression of relevant feelings are legitimate. (1970, p. 128)

In comparing Argyris' (1970) and Klein's (1968) answer to Question 4 with Laing's (1965, 1967) and Marcuse's (1964), one sees a similarity in terms of their analyses of the general public's lack of awareness and insight into the true conditions threatening cherished values. There is also agreement on the tendency for people to define their problems in relationship to previously established normative standards.

Question 5: What are the levers for change?

Klein (1968) answers this question when he states:

> Ultimately, the overall goal of a community-oriented mental health center becomes that of community improvement. The major efforts and energies of the mental health team then becomes devoted to gaining a better understanding of basic community processes and to developing the means for making them more conducive to the emotional well-being of individuals. (1968, p. 199)

Hence, for Klein, the key levers for change involve interventions to facilitate healthy community processes (patterns). The following are a list of some of the key activities Klein advocates for community mental health workers:

1. He advocates the reduction of the cleavages and distrust prevalent in community life which are often correlated with indices of social and emotional pathology. Klein advocates that the mental health worker act as a "bridge" between disparate and conflicting segments of the community. When conflict is between the community and large regional, state, and national organizations, Klein advocates the role of a "linking pin" to connect the concerns of the community with these other groups.

2. Klein advocates the community mental health worker serve as a developer of human resources within the community. He believes they should try to identify, support, and cultivate the talents of potential community leadership. This involves training of volunteers and professionals for civic leadership and competence.

3. Klein suggests that the community mental health worker should encourage the community to build evaluation into any planned community action sequence. Klein argues further:

> Handled properly, evaluation of community action can serve as a useful aid to those involved. Ideally, data collection and feedback should be attempted at every step along the way. The information sought should be of the kind that will facilitate understanding of the goals being sought, the extent to which those involved believe that progress has been made toward their goals, and their perceptions of problems still to be faced, steps to be taken, and the like. This kind of evaluation research is incorporated within the action system itself; the data, which are made available to all concerned, are part of the mechanisms which determines the appropriate steps to be taken. (1968, p. 191)

4. Some of the basic community processes that Klein feels the community mental health worker should have a working knowledge of and an ability to facilitate include the following:

   a) How community policy is shaped and decisions made;

   b) Interactions between diverse community groups;

   c) Communication of information and values;

   d) How community leadership is fostered and encouraged to deal with the myriad problems of community life.

5. An issue that Klein sees of special importance is the management of conflict through rational means. Conflict is seen as an inevitable part of community living but constructive community action cannot result from extreme and destructive forms of conflict.

Therefore, Klein believes that a community must develop suitable and non-destructive means for allowing conflict to occur or face the danger of reduced community integration. One approach to conflict management that Klein discusses is based on an analysis of the communication patterns and processes. Klein states:

> The basic assumption underlying the communication approach to conflict resolution is derived from psychotherapeutic experience and intergroup experiences in the religious, racial, and industrial fields. It holds that mutual exploration by the factions of previously uncharted depths leads to rational understanding of the nature of the problem; that with increased understanding comes better organization of controls, more effective channels of communication, and therefore more opportunities to secure relevant information, leading in the end to the institution of better patterns for solving future problems. (1968, p. 159)

Argyris (1970) answers this question in terms of a process of consulting he calls "intervention." He describes the three processes which constitute the primary intervention task.

> To summarize, an interventionist is someone who enters an ongoing system or set of relationships primarily to achieve three tasks. They are: (1) to help generate valid and useful information; (2) to create conditions in which clients can make informed and free choices; and (3) to help clients develop an internal commitment to their choice. (1970, p. 31)

What is significant about Argyris' approach is that he advocates the use of these "process" levers no matter what the substantive objectives are for the organization. His commitment is to "process change" and feels it is a violation of the interventionist role and clients' "freedom of choice" to tell the client system what criteria of system success they should use, or what values they should accept or reject. As long as the client system is working toward fulfilling the three primary process tasks, Argyris feels they should be aided.

For Argyris, the "processes" by which systems operate are not separable from the substantive human problems of systems. There is a basic congruence for Argyris between effective intervention processes (i.e., primary intervention tasks) and effective client system operations. To attempt to alter the substantive problems without altering the processes through which organizations operate would be for Argyris comparable to making changes without getting at the basic causes.

Argyris describes his approach as it relates to the issue of change:

> A second implication states that change is not a primary task of the interventionist. To repeat, the interventionist's primary tasks are to generate valid information, to help the client system make informed and responsible choices, and develop internal commitment to these choices. One choice that the clients may make is to change aspects of their system. If this choice is made responsibly, the interventionist may help the client to change. However, the point we are making is that change is not a priori considered good and no change considered bad. (1970, pp. 21-22)

Argyris elaborates elsewhere:

> Focusing on the three primary tasks also helps an interventionist prevent himself from falling into the trap of being associated ahead of time with certain types of managerial styles. For example, some interventionists have written that participation is the most effective managerial style; that power equalization is good; and that democratic management is inevitable.
>
> All these statements may or may not be true for the particular client system being served at this time. It may be that from a careful analysis, the client system chooses autocracy for certain decisions, makes the power differential between subordinate and superior even greater, and decreases the amount of participation under certain conditions. The information needed to support the validity of these choices will not tend to be generated with the help of an interventionist whose values are already commited to the effectiveness of a particular management style. (1970, p. 24)

In keeping with his commitment to the primary tasks, Argyris offers the following model for an interventionist's effectiveness.

> To summarize, the preceding discussion represents a model of interventionist effectiveness. The more an interventionist is able (1) to have confidence in his philosophy of intervening, (2) to regress minimally under stress, (3) to understand and use client attacks constructively, (4) to trust his own experience of reality and his repertoire of skills, and (5) to invest ambiguity with valid meanings, the greater is the probability that he will help to reduce the resisting forces in the relationship and help the clients and himself increase the pushing forces toward change. There conditions, in turn, increase the probability that the interventionist will experience himself, and be seen by others as an effective interventionist.
>
> . . . An interventionist who is able to accept his own and his clients' behavior even under conditions of stress will tend to find it easier to create relationship with the client that can produce effectiveness in intervention behavior. These behaviors include owning up to, being open toward, and experimenting with ideas and feelings. The interventionist strives to communicate and to help others communicate ideas and feelings by using observed categories and by minimizing attributions, evaluations, and contradictary comments. (1970, pp. 149-150)

In comparing the levers for change described by Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968) with Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964), one sees that there is a good deal of overlap and some omissions.

The following are a list of levers for change emphasized by Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964), but not by Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968).

1. A demystification of experience through an awareness of authentic personal and social sources of oppression and conflict.
2. Consciousness of social indoctrination and oppression and awareness of how we are preconditional to want to (1) produce, (2) consume, (3) compete, (4) possess, etc. in keeping with current technological and economic needs of our social system.
3. Recognition of the vulnerability to cooptation of oppositional and transcending alternatives through their wholesale incorporation into the established order. The ideal becomes prostituted

through the depletion of its oppositional and substantive values while its form (i.e., technology) is reproduced and displayed on a massive scale. In this way, rationality of its protest against the established order is absorbed and the potentially transcending alternative ends up supporting the existing social order.

In analyzing levers 1 and 2, one realizes that Argyris' and Klein's analyses of the sources of social conflict and oppression tend to be an "aborted" one. They do not deal with the sources of conflict beyond the institutional and community level. Missing from their approach is a comprehensive analysis of the dynamic interrelationship existing between the technological and economic base of our society; the collaborating socialization mechanisms, and individual behavior.

In analyzing the omission of lever 3, one again sees as with Lewin (1948) and Maslow (1965) how vulnerable to cooptation the field of laboratory training is. Both Argyris' (1970) and Klein's (1968) downplay and delete substantive values from their approaches. The "quality of the processes" employed (e.g., primary intervention tasks, integrative patterns in community life) becomes the "sine qua non" for institutional competence and community improvement. Their approach makes the fallacious assumption that system processes are inseparable from system outcomes. It works on the simple formula that if the processes are humane, and the structures are congruent with these processes, then the systems are humane. Argyris' and Klein's approach are weak because they invoke an isolated and encapsulated view of social reality. Argyris, especially, makes little mention of the responsibility and relationship of the institution to the larger community, the environment, or democratic

society. Humane processes and structures can still conceivably lead to institutional products such as napalm and community by-products such as pollution, if the larger technological and economic realities support these products and by-products. In the long run, can we think in terms of healthy institutions and communities, and ignore their interrelatedness with the overall health and priorities of our technology, economy, and general culture?

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

"Progress Towards What?"-- "The Laboratory Training Movement"

Before presenting my summary statement, I would like to point out some important limitations of this study and some of its implications for theory and research. This study was not intended to be a definitive and comprehensive analysis of the field of laboratory training. Rather it sought to be a representative analysis of some of the important social issues and trends raised by laboratory training's commitment to social change.

It is important to keep in mind that by selecting Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964) as the contemporary social critics to answer the questions raised by Mills (1959), I excluded other contemporary critics who would have answered these questions differently and thus would have provided a different social frame of reference to analyze laboratory training. The same could be said for my selection of Argyris (1970), Klein (1968), Lewin (1948), and Maslow (1965). Since I have stated elsewhere my rationale for selecting the sources I used, the point to be made here is that other sources in the field of human relations might have answered Mills (1959) questions differently. Thus my analysis raises issues and suggests answers but they must be considered as "qualified" ones, qualified to the extent that the sources I chose to use for my

methodology and analysis were representative or non-representative of the important issues and trends in the field of laboratory training.

Implications for Theory and Research

1. If laboratory training is to be seen as a force for social change, then its interrelatedness with the larger social system must be analyzed and studied.
   A. The dynamics of the system linkages that exist between the technology, the collaborating socialization mechanisms, and the individual's action, attitude, and social role must be studied and analyzed as they relate to laboratory training principles and values.
   B. The analysis of sources of conflict existing between laboratory training values and our society must extend beyond an isolated institutional and community perspective. It should incorporate an analysis of the relationship existing between laboratory values and the predominant cultural values.
2. Laboratory training must clearly differentiate between legitimate personal versus social sources of oppression and conflict. From this there follows a need to develop and study guidelines for distinguishing personal troubles from social issues.
3. Laboratory training must develop a consciousness of the sources of social indoctrination and oppression which precondition people and limit their freedom of mind, spirit, and choice.
4. Laboratory training must recognize and study the danger of it being coopted to serve antithetical ends. It must analyze the

processes of protest absorption and develop guidelines as to the appropriate and inappropriate use of its methodology in the selection of its clients.

In developing a concluding statement on the relationship of laboratory training to social change, I have seen the need to tie this to the overall issue of progress. How one defines progress can be a determining factor for the type of social changes one advocates. If one approaches progress as a neutral term, than our society's preoccupation with change and growth can be considered an indication that we are progressing. If one views progress as a moral concept, then one might ask the question, "Progress Towards What?" The latter approach will serve as the focus for this discussion.

The Human Relations School as exemplified by Kurt Lewin (1948) has accepted the prevailing American definition of progress in terms of expanding production and consumption. Lewin's prime concern is the development of "means" (i.e., methods) for humanizing the technological process so that it might more effectively lead to the implementation of the above definition of progress. Lewin does not seem to question the direction and end products of technology, nor does he see a strong need for the establishment of different institutions or new directions for the productive process. His values are based on the belief and faith that a basic harmony of interests exists between the good society (American democracy) and citizen needs and interests. Therefore, America's values and priorities are seen as basically congruent with the opportunities and choices open to the individual. Hence, Lewin's commitment to progress is not to qualitative changes but rather to the

improvement and adjustments which would hasten the current directions of progress.

Lewin's perspective on progress contrasts with Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964) who see a basic conflict of interests existing between society and the individual. They believe that the vested interests of our society are organized around the principle of pseudo-scarcity and competitive-survival which creates a destructive form of the struggle for existence within and between the individual members of that society. For Laing (1965, 1967) and Marcuse (1964) continued progress demands the radical subversion of the prevailing direction and organization of progress leading to the establishment of different institutions, a new direction for the productive process, and new modes of human existence.

Maslow (1965) (another exemplary of the Human Relations School) also tends to see a basic harmony of interests between the way American society is organized and the psychological needs of people. He believes American society is currently fostering the conditions necessary for optimal human development. Unlike Lewin, Maslow's notion of progress does point to a vision of qualitative social change in the concept of synergy. Synergy is the term Maslow uses to stand for the institutional equivalent of psychological health within individuals. It is a resolution of the dichotomy between selfishness and unselfishness, private interests and public interests in terms of a higher unity and interrelatedness. It is achieved by institutional arrangements so that when an individual is pursuing his own goals, he is automatically helping others, and when he is being altruistic, he is automatically rewarded.

Maslow's analyses (1965), like Lewin's (1948), minimizes the threat and conflict existing between the way the technological base of American society is organized and the establishment of synergic systems. From Maslow's (1965) analysis, one sees no mention of how the technological base of our society is organized around perpetuating a false sense of deprivation of basic needs thereby fostering conditions which tend to fixate people at lower levels of need gratification. By preconditioning people to want to produce, and consume, and having planned obsolescence as a basic feature of our economy, conditions are created which help to perpetuate a pseudo-scarcity, survival orientation which works against the attainment of higher levels of human development required for Maslow's synergic principles to prosper. Hence, Maslow, by minimizing the existence of the conflict between the way our society is organized and human needs, makes the "fallacious assumption" that the direction of progress he advocates can be achieved basically through established institutions with their established priorities. Maslow fails to realize that institutions organized to serve the "struggle for existence" can not very well serve the need to optimally develop beyond the existence level.

In comparing the notion of progress of Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968), two current laboratory practitioners, one sees some agreement in acknowledging that a conflict exists between the values for progress they are espousing and the way American society is organized. However, the analysis of the conflict is not as extensive and encompassing for Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968) as it is for Laing and Marcuse. Klein tends to see the conflict as existing between community processes and individual

needs, and Argyris tends to focus on the conflict between institutional systems and individual needs. Hence, for Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968), progress is basically not defined in terms of societal change as Laing and Marcuse tend to do; but rather for Klein in terms of "community improvement" and for Argyris in terms of "organizational system competence and effectiveness."

What is crucially lacking in Argyris' approach (1970) and Klein's (1968) analysis are the dynamics of the overall system linkages and conflicts that exist between our self-perpetuating, pseudo-scarcity, oriented technology and our collaborating socialization mechanisms and individuals' actions, attitudes, and social roles.

Within the scope of their definitions of progress, "organizational competence and effectiveness" and "community improvement" the quality of the processes employed by these systems (e.g., primary intervention tasks, integrative patterns in community) becomes the ultimate criteria for measuring their progress.

The problem with "process values" becoming the "sine qua non" for progress rests with judging how complete or inclusive these values are. Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968), being mainly concerned with a process methodology (means), are attempting to answer such questions as, "How to live?" "How a job should be performed?" "How community problems should be handled?"

The fallacious assumption that Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968) make is that system processes are inseparable from system outcomes. They work from the simple formula that if the processes are humane and the structures are humane, then the systems will be inevitably humane. The

weakness with this approach is that it works from an isolated and encapsulated view of social reality. Humane processes and structures can still conveivably lead to inhumane products and by-products.

When one looks at things critically, does it really help society in the long run if we create "sensitive missile builders" and "empathetic napalm makers?" Does it really contribute to society's humanity if these missile builders and napalm makers are divided up into decentralized task forces whose most influential members are the most technically competent in the creation of these products? In the long run, does it really contribute to humanity if the laboratory training methodology helps these workers develop an emotional commitment as well as a task orientation towards their work?

These "exaggerated" examples highlight a problem that the field of laboratory training has yet to fully tackle. Should its process methodology be employed to implement effective functioning within perspectives and goal priorities as currently defined? Jean Hills has pointed to this dilemma by raising the question of whether behavioral scientists, when applying their skills to solving organizational problems, tend to perpetuate established ideologies and systems because of the blinders imposed by their limited definition of what constitutes a problem (1965, pp. 23-40). In the long run, can the field of laboratory training continue to think in terms of healthy institutions and communities (as Argyris and Klein tend to do) and ignore their relationship to the overall health and priorities of our technology, economy, and general culture?

A factor which tends to neutralize laboratory trainers' advocacy and weds them to established ideologies and priorities is their

conceptualization of the meaning of "freedom of choice." Argyris (1970) states very clearly that preserving the freedom of choice of his client system takes precedence over his advocacy of any changes. To act in any other manner, Argyris (1970) believes would have dire consequences for the long range health and integrity of the client system regardless of how much the specific changes might be needed. Argyris (1970) describes freedom of choice in the following manner:

> Free choice implies voluntary as opposed to automatic; proactive rather than reactive. The act of selection is rarely accomplished by maximizing or optimizing. Free and informed choice entails what Simon has called "satisficing" that is, selecting the alternative with the highest probability of succeeding given some specified cost constraints. Free choice places the locus of decision-making in the client system. Free choice makes it possible for the clients to remain responsible for their destiny. Through free choice, the clients can maintain the autonomy of their systems. (1970, pp. 18-19)

In order for Argyris' conceptualization of freedom of choice to be viable, it rests on the underlying assumption that equality of opportunity to choose exists. Free choice, in order to work, must assume that an open, free, and fair market place of ideas and values exist. When these conditions are met, "authentic cultural pluralism" can exist.

These conditions are not presently being met in contemporary American society. Conglomerates and monopolies are a way of life in America, resulting in our pluralism being biased in terms of certain military and industrial interests. The inevitable result is that our social choices (options) are heavily influenced by certain organized vested interest groups which perpetuate a pseudo-scarcity, survival oriented culture.

The cards are stacked from the beginning (i.e., vested interests of society) and the deal favors certain players (i.e., choice points)

over others. The laboratory trainer by not challenging the rules of the game but playing the game as if it were a fair one invariably ends up supporting a "fixed choice," a predetermined outcome: the prevailing ideology and priorities of our society. For as Argyris tells us:

> . . . Free and informed choice entails what Simon calls "satisficing" that is selecting the alternative with the highest probability of succeeding, given some specified cost constraints. (1970, pp. 18-19)

How can the field of laboratory training make "authentic freedom of choice" operational? How can laboratory training realistically contribute toward making the option for people "to maximize their human potential" a socially viable one? How can laboratory training contribute toward making our institutions and communities humane given the realities and priorities of the larger social system?

Part of the answer to these questions lies in summarizing the reasons for laboratory training's previous failures in not achieving the above objectives up to now. First, the historical and philosophical background out of which laboratory training has emerged tends to deny and/or minimize the prevasiveness of the conflict existing between laboratory training values (i.e., cooperative culture) and the way society is currently organized. Even when the conflict existing between laboratory training values and larger systems are acknowledged as some current practitioners do e.g., Argyris (1970) and Klein (1968), it tends to be a limited analysis of conflict. Thus, the changes that are advocated (e.g., organizational effectiveness, community improvement) are not as extensive and prevasive as the larger social realities would dictate.

Another tendency in laboratory training that works against social change is to identify and limit an analysis of social problems to "process"

issues. Process issues are very important, but when stressed to the detriment of also looking at substantive value issues (e.g., organizational products and by-products), it leads to an incomplete and superficial analysis. Thus the danger for the field of laboratory training is that by delimiting problems to process-method issues, it runs the risk of perpetuating a blissful band of "myopic visionaries." In order to avoid this pitfall laboratory training must develop a series of guidelines as to the appropriate and inappropriate use of its methodology in terms of product and by-product issues (substantive values) in addition to its already strong concern for process values.

As previously discussed, the current laboratory conceptualization of "freedom of choice" often neutralizes laboratory trainers' change utility and weds them to established ideologies and priorities. In order to make "authentic" freedom of choice a social reality laboratory trainers must be advocates for it rather than accept the current socially administered and predetermined choices. Only by demanding a new deck of cards and refusing to play with a deck that is already stacked and marked against them does the field of laboratory training stand a chance for realizing their social goals and concerns.

As Herbert Marcuse concludes in "One Dimensional Man" in referring to what is needed to change society,

> . . . The fact that they start refusing to play the game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period.
>
> . . . Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals it as a rigged game. (1964, pp. 256-257)

What is the mechanism (vehicle) through which laboratory training could possibly achieve these goals? How could this potentially subversive

alternative for change be actualized? Research in the field of social movements offers us some guidelines. Blumer (1951) in his characterization of general social movements seems to be describing the qualities presently found in the human relations movement. He characterizes "general social movements" as follows:

> General social movements take the form of groping and uncoordinated efforts. They have only a general direction, toward which they move in a slow, halting, yet persistent fashion. As movements they are unorganized, with neither established leadership nor recognized membership, and little guidance or control. (p. 200)

Blumer goes on to say that general movements constitute the source out of which more organized and efficient movements may grow. The general social movement may give rise to a specific social movement which facilitates the process and focusses the direction of the advocated changes.

Killian, in describing characteristics of successful social movements offers criteria that the field of human relations might adopt as guidelines if it wishes to become a more effective force for social change:

1. The existence of shared values--a goal or an objective, sustained by an ideology.

2. A sense of membership or participation--a "we-ness," a distinction between those who are for and those against.

3. Norms--shared understandings as to how the followers should act, definitions of out-groups and how to behave toward them.

4. A structure--a division of labor between leaders and followers and between different classes of each. (1964, p. 430)

Killian (1964) writes that the roots of all social movement for change grow from a collective frustration with the social order. Cannot the field of human relations be understood in such terms? Maliver (1971) believes that the human relations movement is a response to the alienation

and frustration that many Americans increasingly experience in their daily lives. The lack of intimacy and close emotional ties prompts people to seek group experiences in the hope that their collective lot can be bettered.

If there can develop in the field of laboratory training a shared consciousness of frustration with the social order coupled with a belief in the possibility of a different state of affairs already offered in the field, then a realizable alternative for change exists. In order for laboratory training to become a realizable alternative, however, it must first liberate itself from its dormant status and organize itself into an enduring and cohesive social movement.

EPILOGUE FOR LABORATORY TRAINING

"When playing the game you have to follow the rules. And if the rules are wrong you are beaten from the beginning. And your victory will then be your own defeat."

Jan Myrdal,

Confessions of a Disloyal European

(New York: Random House, 1968, pp. 165-166)

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